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Harmonizing ‘Converted Wetland’ Under the
Clean Water Act and Food Security Act
Would Reaffirm Congress’s Intent To Limit
EPA and Army Corps 404 Jurisdiction©
Lawrence A. Kogan*
INTRODUCTION
This Article explains the legal significance of the federal
agency designation of a farm or field as a “converted wetland”
(“CW”), considering Congress’s use of the terms of art “wetland”
and “converted wetland” in the statutory text of the Food Security
Act of 1985 (“FSA”). It also explains how the plain textual
meaning of these terms can and should be used to reaffirm
Congress’s intent to limit federal agency wetland jurisdiction
under the 1977 Clean Water Act (“CWA”) § 404 amendments over
historical mixed-use wet pasturelands converted to croplands for
economically beneficial purposes.
In support of this thesis, the Article explores: (1) the
historical underpinnings of CWA § 404; (2) the critical importance
of plain textual meaning especially in CWA wetlands litigation;
(3) how contrary to plain textual meaning federal courts
exclusively inferred from politically contentious and ambivalent
legislative history CWA § 404 coverage of non-tidal inland
wetlands located adjacent to manmade ditches and converted
wetlands; (4) how contrary to plain textual meaning federal
courts ignored the explicit text of the Food Security Act of 1985
calling for the safe harbor treatment of certain converted
wetlands; and (5) how federal district courts’ exercise of their
inherent equity jurisdiction can be employed to entertain postjudgment 60(b) motions in CWA § 404 enforcement actions,
thereby enabling the reexamination of previously controversial
wetland determinations to reach a just and fair result for farmers
and ranchers.
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Lastly, this Article recommends that the district court in

United States v. Brace1 and other similar actions apply this
analysis for the purpose of equitably resolving such disputes.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CLEAN WATER ACT §404
From the time the Nixon administration created the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and secured enactment
of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (“FWCPA”),2 a growing environmental movement influenced
Congress.3 Under this influence, Congress, in 1972, expanded the
*Author Info Lawrence A. Kogan is managing principal of The Kogan Law
Group, P.C., New York, N.Y., a multidisciplinary law firm focused on federal
environmental defense, federal Indian law, and federal constitutional matters. He is also
the chief executive of the federal and international policy-focused nonprofit Institute for
Trade, Standards and Sustainable Development (ITSSD), Princeton, Junction, N.J.,
http://www.itssdusa.org/. The author developed the material contained in this Article
from the research he conducted incident to his defense of the Brace family against two
parallel federal Clean Water Act Section 404 wetland violation cases the U.S. Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) filed against them in January 2017. Mr. Kogan has served as
environmental defense counsel advising farmers, ranchers, and land developers on
wetland issues arising in federal agency CWA 404 administrative investigation matters
and CWA 404 federal district court enforcement actions arising in multiple states across
the nation, including Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Michigan, Utah, and Idaho.
1 United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994), rev’g,No.90-229
(W.D.Pa.Dec.16,1993) (this reversal led Brace to enter into a consent agreement with the
Government which the district court entered on September 23, 1996. Although the U.S.
Department of Agriculture had acknowledged that Brace had fully implemented the
consent decree by late December 1996, the case docket does not reflect that the
Government ever sought or secured a Court order reaffirming that Brace had fully
satisfied the consent decree. The Government subsequently alleged Brace had violated the
1996 consent decree by having committed certain “unauthorized” acts within and
surrounding the consent decree area during 2013 and 2014, and it brought suit to enforce
the consent decree on January 9, 2017.); see United States’ Mot. To Enforce Consent
Decree and for Stipulated Penalties at 1, United States v. Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 4, 1990), ECF No. 82; see also United States’ Mem. Of Law in Support of Mot. to
Enforce Consent Decree and for Stipulated Penalties at 1, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF
No. 83.
2 See Lawrence A. Kogan, CWA § 404: How So Few Words Re Wetlands Have So
Greatly Impaled Private Property Rights, KY. J. OF EQUINE AGRI. & NAT. RESOURCES L.
SIXTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM (Feb. 28, 2020), http://www.kjeanrl.com/previoussymposiums
(last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/D32W-255N].
3 See Lawrence A. Kogan, The Europeanization of the Great Lakes States’

Wetland Laws and Regulations (at the Expense of Americans’ Constitutionally Protected
Private Property Rights), 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 687, 697 (2019), ,
https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/lr/vol2019/iss3/3/ [https://perma.cc/7BHA-SDEU]; see
also Meir Rinde, Richard Nixon and the Rise of American Environmentalism, SCI. HIST.
INST. (June 2, 2017), https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/magazine/richard-nixonand-the-rise-of-american-environmentalism [https://perma.cc/4FSE-GELU]; Annie Snider,
Clean Water Act: Vetoes by Eisenhower, Nixon Presaged Today’s Partisan Divide , EE
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2012), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059971457 [https://perma.cc/2DNVHWPR] (noting that the FWCPA later became known as the clean water act).
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scope of FWCPA jurisdiction over direct land-based discharges
from “navigable waters” to “waters of the United States.”4
Before the 1972 Clean Water Act (“CWA”) amendments,
the term “navigable waters,” as used in the Acts of July 7, 18385
and August 30, 18526 regulating steamboats moving on the
“navigable waters of the United States,” had been defined
pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in The
Daniel Ball, as waters “navigable in fact.”7 The Court based its
determination on the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, rather than common law.8 Historical accounts of the
CWA’s evolution confirmed the focus of Congress’s amendments
to the CWA were to regulate companies discharging hazardous
pollutants (chemicals) from point sources “on small, nonnavigable tributaries” (i.e., on rivers or streams not navigable in
fact).9 Indeed, the focus was not to control small nonpoint sources
of soil erosion and surface water runoff from small and mediumsized farmlands, which environmentalists and the EPA now
claim affects offsite water quality.10 To achieve its objective,
Congress “asserted jurisdiction over ‘waters of the United States’
[…by] simply equat[ing] this term with ‘navigable waters.’”11
4 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816-865 (1972).
5 An Act to Provide for the Better Security of the Lives of Passengers on Board of
Vessels Propelled in Whole or in part by Steam, 25th Cong., Sess. II., Ch. 191, Secs. 2 and
3, 5 Stat. 304 (1838).
6 An Act to Amend an Act Entitled ‘An Act to provide for the better Security of
the lives of Passengers on board of Vessels propelled in whole or in part by Steam,’ and for
other purposes, 32nd Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 105, 106 (1852).
7 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 557, 563 (1871) (holding that “public navigable rivers in law […] are
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition as highways for commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted
in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”).
8 Id. (“And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the
meaning of the acts of Congress, […] when they form in their ordinary condition by
themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is
or may be carried on with other states or foreign countries in the customary modes in
which such commerce is conducted by water.”); See also The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
430, 440-42 (1874) (this two-part definition ultimately became important to the definition
of federal territorial jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.); see infra.
9
See
Arthur
Holst,
Clean
Water
Act,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Clean-Water-Act [https://perma.cc/RRU5-KFMM] (last
viewed Nov. 25, 2020); see also ENVIRONMENTAL WORKS, History of the Clean Water Act,
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.environmentalworks.com/history-of-the-clean-water-act/
[https://perma.cc/XR58-C5PQ].
10 Michael Blumm and D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean
Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform ,
60 U. COLO. L. REV. 695, 704 (1989).
11 Id.; see also CWA § 502(7).
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While the “EPA quickly embraced a broad jurisdiction for
its permit program under section 402 of the Act [overseeing State
CWA implementation of point source pollution], the Corps
resisted,”12 having had more limited enforcement jurisdiction
under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.13 “To the Corps,
[CWA] section 404 was simply an exemption from the new EPA
permit system for its preexisting regulatory program.”14 This
difference in perspective created uncertainty about the Corps’s
role in implementing the FWCPA/CWA.15 As a result,
environmental activist groups initiated litigation in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia in 1974,16 challenging
the Corps’s narrow regulatory interpretation of its jurisdiction.17
On March 27, 1975, the district court issued an order
directing the Corps to promulgate proposed regulations “clearly
reflecting the full mandate of the [CWA].”18 The Corps responded
to that court order on May 6, 1975, when it issued proposed

12 Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 10; Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, supra note 4.
13An Act Making Appropriations for the Construction, Repair, and Preservation
of Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors, and for other Purposes, 55th Cong., Sess.
III. Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 1-54).
14 Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 10.
15

Id.

Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
See Permits for Activities in Navigable or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115,
12119 (Apr. 3, 1974) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 209.120) (final regulations prescribing the
policies, practice and procedures to be followed in the processing of Department of Army
permits authorizing structures and work in or affecting navigable waters of the United
States pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (33 U.S.C. 401 et seq..), and the
discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters pursuant to Section 404 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1344), inter alia.) [https://perma.cc/S9XYRTRK]. Significantly, in a 1988 magazine interview, Charles Hollis, former Chief of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory Branch in Wilmington, North Carolina,
admitted that, prior to the enactment of the Food Security Act of 1985, “[t]he Army Corps
ha[d] generally enforced 404 permits only on the coast” due to “the public’s opposition to
land-use regulations in general.” See Suzanne Goyer, What Are Wetlands?, North
Carolina
Insight
(March
1988),
73-74,
at
74,
https://nccppr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/What_Are_Wetlands.pdf . See also Lawrence S. Earley, Hope For
Our
Wetlands,
51
Wildlife
in
North
Carolina
4,
7
(Sept.
1987),
https://ia800202.us.archive.org/15/items/wildlifeinnorthc51nort/wildlifeinnorthc51nort.pdf
(quoting Charles Hollis, chief of the regulatory branch of the U.S. Corps of Engineers in
Wilmington – “Before this law [Food Security Act of 1985 ‘swampbuster’ provision],
farmers were exempt from the wetland protection provisions of Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act. ‘A farmer could do just about anything he wanted without having 404 bother
him,’ he says. ‘Now, he’s no longer exempt and the wetlands issue is on his head.’”).
18 392 F.Supp. at 686 (directing the Corps to publish “proposed regulations
clearly recognizing the full regulatory mandate of the Water Act.”).
16
17
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regulations setting forth four alternative regulatory proposals, 19
ranging from that most favored by environmentalists, extending
to inland as well as coastal tidal wetlands and waters
(Alternative 1),20 to that most favored by the Corps (Alternative
4), imposing more limited jurisdiction.21 Environmentalist groups
immediately charged the Corps with scaremongering when the
press release it had issued prefacing these proposed regulations
warned farmers and ranchers that stock pond alterations,
irrigation ditch modifications, and field plowing under
Alternative 1 would be subject to 404 permitting.22 Eventually,
the Corps was compelled to revise its regulations to more broadly
exercise jurisdiction over “waters of the United States.”23
Ongoing public debates over the scope of the FWPCA
regulations continued between 1972 and 1975, despite the
Corps’s efforts in adjusting its regulations to satisfy the
environmental movement’s broad interpretation of Congress’s

19 See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg.
19766-19768 (May 6, 1975) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 209) (prescribing proposed
regulations setting forth four alternatives pertaining to the regulation by the Corps under
FWPCA (CWA) 404 of discharges of dredge or fill material in navigable waters.).
20 Id. at 19767 ( Under “Alternative 1,” the Corps’s “jurisdiction over the disposal
of dredged or fill material would extend to virtually every coastal and inland artificial or
natural waterbody,” including “all navigable waters of the United States […] up to their
headwaters.” It would “also extend to all coastal, riverine, estuarine and lake waters
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward […] regardless of whether those wetlands
are regularly or only periodically inundated by saltwater, brackish water, or fresh water .”)
(emphasis added).
21 Id. at 19768 (Under “Alternative 4,” the Corps adopted “the limited definition
of Alternative 2, and the initial State certification and authorization requirements of
Alternative 3 prior to any processing of the section 404 application for the disposal of
dredged and fill material in waters other than navigable waters of the United States.”);
See also id. at 19767 (Under “Alternative 2,” “[j]urisdiction over inland waters under this
limited definition would include all navigable waters of the United States up to their
headwaters and all primary tributaries of such waters up to their headwaters. In addition,
no section 404 permits would be required for the discharge of dredged or fill material
amounting to 100 cubic yards or less into primary tributaries of navigable waters of the
United States or into waters beyond the head of navigation of navigable waters of the
United States.”).
22 James Curtiss, The Clean Water Act of 1977: Midcourse Correction in the
Section 404 Program, 57 NEB. L. REV. 1092, 1103 (1978) (citing 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 145
(1975).
23 See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44585, EVOLUTION OF
THE MEANING OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” IN THE CLEAN WATER ACT 10 (2019);

see also “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS): Current Status of the 2015 Clean Water
Rule,
EVERYCRSREPORT
(Dec.
6,
2018
–
Dec.
12,
2018),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45424.html
[https://perma.cc/B346-6PEG]
(stating the Army Corps of Engineers… [has] defined the term in regulations several
times as part of their implementation of the act”).
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intent.24 Once President Ford became involved in this debate
during July 1976, the U.S. Senate initiated hearings “to
reconsider the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction under section
404.”25 The Congressional debates that followed dramatically
expanded CWA § 404 and were publicly portrayed as a putative
“compromise” of competing interests.26 However, public debates
were renewed over the scope of CWA § 404 soon after the EPA
and the Corps issued implementing regulations, reflecting that
the compromise had overlooked the objections of the nation’s
small and medium-sized farmers and ranchers.27
It bears repeating that a review of the Corps’s 1974 CWA §
404-implementing regulations reveals the definition of “navigable
waters of the United States” covered waters “subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide, and/or presently, or have been in the past, or
may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate
or foreign commerce.”28 U.S. navigable waters had not then been
expressly extended to cover freshwater wetlands adjacent to
nontidal tributaries of U.S. navigable waters.29 The interim final
regulations the Corps later issued on July 25, 1975, however,
included “periodically inundated freshwater wetlands contiguous
with or adjacent to navigable waters, periodically inundated
freshwater wetlands contiguous with or adjacent to navigable
waters, and…certain interstate waters based on nontransportation impacts on interstate commerce.”30
Final July 19, 1977 Corps regulations implementing CWA
§ 404 explicitly excluded wetlands adjacent to tributaries to U.S.
MULLIGAN, supra note 23, at 10–12.
Curtiss, supra note 22, at 1105–06.
26 See Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 10, at 727; see also Clean Water Act of 1977
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); see also United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 137 (1985) (quoting 123 Cong. Rec. 39209 (1977))
(stating “[t]he Conference Committee adopted the Senate’s approach: efforts to narrow the
definition of ‘waters’ were abandoned; the legislation as ultimately passed, in the words of
Senator Baker, ‘retain[ed] the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation’s waters
exercised in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act.’”).
27 See Curtiss, supra note 22, at 1107–12.
28 The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United
States,” 85 Fed. Reg. 22250, 22254 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328) (citing 39 Fed. Reg.
12115, 12119 (codified at 33 C.F.R. 209.120) (1974) and referencing the Corps’s 1975
interim regulations).
29
See id. (“Environmental organizations challenged the Corps’ 1974
regulations…arguing that the Corps’ definition of “navigable waters” was inadequate
because it did not include tributaries or coastal marshes above the mean high tide mark or
wetlands above the ordinary high-water mark.”)
30 Id.; see also Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40
Fed. Reg. 31319, 31320, 31324 (July 25, 1975) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(h)).
24
25
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navigable waters from the coverage of “waters of the United
States” (“WOTUS”) where said “tributaries” actually were
“manmade nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on
dry land.”31 Those final regulations defined the term “adjacent” as
“bordering, contiguous, or neighboring.”32 In this context, “dry
land” meant other than “wetlands,” which had been redefined as
follows:
Those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and
duration sufficient to support, and that under
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions. Wetlands generally include
swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.33
The preamble to the Corps’s 1977 final regulations clarified the
agency had not intended “to assert jurisdiction over those areas
that once were wetlands and part of an aquatic system, but
which, in the past, have been transformed into dry land for
various purposes.”34 Despite the absence of any 1977 CWA
statutory text expressing Congress’s intent to subject the
discharge of dredged or fill materials into non-tidal wetlands
adjacent to manmade ditches not considered WOTUS to federal
CWA § 404 permitting, the EPA and Corps officials inferred such
congressional intent from historical legislative debates.35
As noted in the Introduction, this Article discusses how, in
United States v. Brace, EPA exercised jurisdiction and control
over nontidal wetlands adjacent to manmade drainage and
irrigation ditches pursuant to CWA § 404, and ignored that Brace
had secured distinct legal treatment under the Food Security Act
of 1985.36 In 1987, multiple federal government agencies had
deployed to the Brace farm and concluded Brace “converted” an
approximately 30-acre tract from nontidal wetlands adjacent to
31 Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material into Waters of the United
States, 42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37144 (July 19, 1977) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(3)).
32 Id. at 37129 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)).
33 Id. at 37128 (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c)).
34

Id.

35

CWA 1977 Amendments, Dec. 27, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, at §

36

Brace, 41 F.3d at 121.

404(g)(1).
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manmade dual function drainage/irrigation ditches.37 Yet, the

U.S. Government refused to recognize that wetlands (wet
pasturelands) conversion for agricultural crop production
purposes qualified for exclusion from CWA § 404 jurisdiction
under this regulation because the land did not continue to
demonstrate “wetland” features.38 The Government also refused
to recognize that Brace had secured a “commenced conversion”
designation from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, enabling
him to complete that conversion within 10 years’s time to secure
protected “prior converted wetland” status under the Food
Security Act of 1985 (“FSA”).39
When the U.S. Government initiated its consent decree
enforcement action against Brace on January 9, 2017, it again
ignored such evidence. In fact, the defendants in Brace were
accused, once again, of not securing required CWA § 404 permits
to engage in normal farming activities and recognized
agricultural ditch maintenance-related activities in and around
the approximate 30-acre consent decree area, even though the
Government had never delineated that area, and EPA and Corps
officials had provided express verbal authorization to the
defendants to undertake such activities on two of their three
adjacent, privately-owned, hydrologically integrated farm tracts
operated as a single farm.40
While on the same farm, the tracts in question are
separated from one another.41 The EPA alleges the violations
occurred on separate fields, consistent with the legal precedent
enabling federal agency officials to arbitrarily divide operating
farms into subunits (e.g., farm tracts and, even, farm fields) each
of which would be treated as separate “farms” for purposes of
1977 CWA § 404 wetlands enforcement. The U.S. Government’s
treatment of these adjacent farm tract fields as separate “farms”
in the absence of express congressional direction to cover nonId. at 119–20.
Id. at 124–26.
39 See discussion infra.
40 See United States’ Mot. To Enforce Consent Decree and for Stipulated
Penalties, supra note 1, at 1; see also United States’ Mem. Of Law in Support of Mot. to
Enforce Consent Decree and for Stipulated Penalties, supra note 1, at 1.
41 See Defendants’ Resp. and Opp’n to United States Second Mot. to Enforce
Consent Decree and for Stipulated Penalties at 4–5, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No.
214; see also United States’ Resp. in Opp’n to Defendants’ Redrafted 60(b)(5) Mot. to
Vacate Consent Decree and Deny Stipulated Penalties at 12, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229,
37
38

ECF No. 318.
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tidal wetlands adjacent to manmade ditches has allowed federal
agencies to misinterpret and overzealously enforce the CWA
normal farming activities and agricultural ditch construction and
maintenance exemptions and the recapture provision, with
devastating effects to the nation’s small and medium-sized
farms.42
The federal courts allowed federal agencies to ignore the
rich agricultural histories of specific regions of the nation,
including
the
extensively
documented,
centuries-old,
mixed/diversified pastureland and cropland farming and use of
tile drainage systems in the Erie Pennsylvania region.43 Federal
courts also compelled farmers, including the Brace defendants, to
concede the issue of whether or not there existed wetlands, as a
matter of science and as a matter of federal jurisdiction, on the
sites/areas in question. The courts redefined “established normal
farming activities” with respect to only the wetland site/area in
question, exclusive of the other areas of the farm or specific farm
tract of which the wetlands is an integral part.44 In those few
42

CWA § 404(f)(1)(A)–(C).

See Pennsylvania Agricultural History Project, PA. HISTORICAL & MUSEUM
COMM’N,
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/
[https://perma.cc/8NDZ-YYPT]; Historic Agricultural Resources of Pennsylvania c 17001960,
PA.
HISTORICAL
&
MUSEUM
COMM’N,
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/history/index.html
[https://perma.cc/QR5T-PJGX]; Northwestern Woodland, Grassland, and Specialized
Farming
Region,
c.
1830-1960,
PA.
HISTORICAL
&
MUSEUM
COMM’N,
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/files/context/northwestern_w
oodland.pdf (containing a case-relevant historical account of northwestern Pennsylvania
agriculture accompanying a U.S. National Park Service National Historic Places
registration, at 11-13, 16-18, 34-35, 48-50, 52, 54-56, 91-92, 94-5, 97, 136-137, and
identifying, on p. 137, how “contradictions in Federal postures towards wetlands were
coming to a head.” And how “farmer Robert Brace and the federal government tangled
over his attempts to drain a 30 acre parcel of his farm.”) [https://perma.cc/3G9B-J5D4];
Lake Erie Fruit and Vegetable Belt, 1870-1960, PA. HISTORICAL & MUSEUM COMM’N,
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/files/context/lake_erie_fruit.p
df [https://perma.cc/ZJU8-F7DL]; Historic Agricultural Resources of Pennsylvania, 17001960: National Register of Historic Places Multiple Property Documentation Form, PA.
HISTORICAL
&
MUSEUM
COMM’N,
http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/portal/communities/agriculture/files/context/mpdf_introducti
on.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PYX-WX8Q]; see also 2019 Updates to PA’s Agricultural History
Project: Additional Guidance for Using Pennsylvania’s Agricultural Context, PA. HISTORIC
PRESERVATION
OFFICE
(Nov.
2019),
https://www.phmc.pa.gov/Preservation/About/Documents/Ag%20Context%20Guidance%20
Update%20November%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3CP-V5EN].
44 See, e.g., United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814, 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1986)
(wherein the approximately 2,900-acre portion consisting of wetlands locally known as the
“Big Swamp” of a farmer’s purchase of 9,600 acres overall in northern California that had
generally been farmed since 1897, was deemed not to have been previously “farmed”
because the 2900-acre portion had “’never been subjected to any established upland
43
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cases where federal agencies prepared and considered scientific
wetland determinations, the courts reviewed such science in the
absence of defendant rebuttal science.45
In effect, the federal courts, in most cases, rubber-stamped
agency determinations as federal wetland science continued to
evolve. The deemed wetlands in question would be presumed to
be “undisturbed” and as constituting the “normal circumstances”
of the area in question.46 Federal courts also entertained the
additional legal idea of normal farming activities, such as natural
and cultivated pasturing and haying.47 As a result, any farmer or
farming […]’ crop production.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Huebner, 752
F. 2d 1235, 1239-42 (7th Cir. 1985) (wherein the Court found that a farmer’s purchase of a

5,000-acre property known as “Bear Bluff Farms”, the largest continuous area of wetlands
in Wisconsin, to expand three existing cranberry beds and “to use a portion of the farm for
growing vegetables and other upland crops” ( e.g., barley and corn) was deemed not to

qualify for the “normal farming activities” exemption from CWA 404 permitting because
the portion of the site/area in question had not been previously farmed with cranberry
beds or upland crops, and also not to qualify for the agricultural ditch maintenance
exemption because the deepening of the ditches expanded them beyond their prior
dimensions. Applying the CWA 404 recapture provisions to each such exemption, the
Court found that such activities consisting of “the side-casting and spreading activity
reduced the reach of the wetlands surrounding the ditches at issue […and thereby
brought] an area of navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject.”)
(emphasis added).
45 See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh , 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1983), slip op. at 4)–(16 (wherein the Court, after reviewing USEPA’s wetland delineation
the Court had previously ordered, which “concluded that approximately eighty percent of
the land [tract] was a wetland, […] decided that a section 404 permit was required for the
land-clearing activities and that over ninety percent of the [20,000-acre] Lake Long Tract
[lying within the 140,000 Bayou Natchitoches basin in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana, which
had previously been deforested and logged by other parties, and which was ‘subject to
flooding during the spring months, and it experience[d] an average rainfall of sixty inches
per year’], was a wetland.”) (emphasis added).
46 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45032 (Aug. 25, 1993) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323 and pt.
328). (Where wetland delineations had been undertaken, as in the original case at bar,
they were often based on the now-defunct 1989 Federal Manual for Identifying and
Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands (“1989 Manual”). “Under the 1989 Manual, […] the

phrase ‘normal circumstances,’ as applied to agricultural areas, meant the circumstances
that would be present absent agricultural activity.” (emphasis added)).

47 For example, during the 3-17-92 deposition of former longtime Waterford
Township, PA resident Adrian Sharp, DOJ-ENRD counsel, David Dana had objected to
Mr. Sharp’s use of the word “farming” for the purpose of distinguishing between crop
farming and pasture or cattle farming for CWA purposes. “Q. Now, obviously you are
familiar with the area. And would you – Your testimony is you are familiar with the
farming practices in the general area? A. Oh, sure. Q. And that would include crop
farming and pasture farming? A. Sure. Mr. Dana: There’s an objection as to – You can
obviously use the word ‘farming’ as the witness understands it. But we may adopt a
different definition of farming. For just general purposes. You might just want to – I just
want it noted for the record. Mr. Ward: What other word would you use? Mr. Dana: Just to
differentiate crop farming from pasture or cattle farming. Mr. Ward: So down the road
your argument is going to be that cattle – raising beef or livestock is not agricultural? Mr.
Dana: No, no. I’m not saying what our argument is. I just want it to be clear as to what
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rancher engaged in longstanding land-use rotations between
wetland and non-wetland crops and/or conversions from wetland
pasturing and haying to cropping would first need to secure
federal agency approval through a time-consuming and very
costly permitting process.
The aggressive EPA/Corps interpretation of the 1977 CWA
§ 404(f)(2) recapture provision has certainly ensured this result.
The EPA and the Corps have required § 404 permits for normal
farming or agricultural ditch maintenance activities that
otherwise would qualify for an exemption, if the discharge of
dredged or fill material into U.S. navigable waters incidental to
such activities had “as its purpose bringing an area of the
navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously
subject,” and “the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be
impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced.”48 Corps
implementing regulations refer to such “new” or “changed” uses
as “conversion[s]” of wetlands concerning “waters of the United
States,” but they do not define the term “converted wetland.”49
Corps implementing regulations also presume a flow or
circulation of such waters may be impaired if the “proposed
discharge will result in significant discernible alterations to [the]
flow or circulation.” 50 However, a “conversion” of wetlands is not
required to meet this standard.51 However, these regulations
ignored the Carter administration’s Council on Environmental
Quality (“CEQ”) findings,52 which recognized normal farming
activities could include converting wetlands to arable land and
not be subject to recapture, so long as extensive areas of water
and water bodies were not converted to dry land.53
the witness is saying when he uses the word ‘farming’” (emphasis added). (Dep. of Adrian
Sharp on March 17th, 1992 at 6–7, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No. 279-41.)
48 Clean Water Act of 1977 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, at §
404(f)(2) (1977).
49 47 Fed. Reg. 31794 (July 22, 1982) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 320-30).
50 Id. at 31813, n.4 (codified at 33 C.F.R. part 323).
51 See generally id.
52

See The Ninth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality,

COUNCIL
ON
ENVTL.
QUALITY
318
(Dec.
1978),
https://www.slideshare.net/whitehouse/august-1978-the-ninth-annual-report-of-thecouncil-on-environmental-quality (“The filling or draining of wetlands does not necessarily
waste the land, which may be turned into other valuable but competing uses. In fact, 24
percent of all agricultural soils in nonfederal lands in the United States were originally
wetland. One-half of wet soils (outside nonfederal lands) falls in the prime farmland class.
With property management, some converted wetland soils can be highly productive
farmlands for years, perhaps centuries.”) [https://perma.cc/88DJ-Z767].
53 123 Cong. Rec. 30, 38379, 39188 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie); see also id.
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Aggressive EPA enforcement of §404 is based on a liberal
interpretation of legislative history, apparently bolstered by the
1979 opinion of Carter administration Attorney General
Benjamin Civiletti.54 The Civiletti opinion concluded “the overall
structure of the Clean Water Act impliedly place[d] responsibility
on EPA to determine the scope of ‘navigable waters’ for the entire
statute” (emphasis added). 55 Civiletti candidly admitted he
reached this conclusion even though “[t]he question is explicitly
resolved neither in § 404 itself nor in its legislative history.”56
Remarkably, the 1979 AG Opinion also inferred:
[W]hile the Act charges the Secretary [of the Army]
with the duty of issuing and assuring compliance
with the terms of § 404 permits, it does not
expressly charge him with responsibility for
deciding when a discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters takes place so
that the § 404 permit requirement is brought into
play. […] I therefore conclude that final authority
under the Act to construe § 404(f) is also vested in
the Administrator.57
Since the Corps’s statutory permitting authority had been
limited exclusively to § 404 discharges of dredged and fill
materials, the Civiletti opinion could have easily construed the
Corps’s more specific, narrow permitting authority as extending
exclusively to its evaluation of the availability of § 404(f) dredge
and fill activity permit exemptions. This would have been the
more logical and reasonable interpretation, especially considering
President Carter’s agricultural background and the significant
public objections the 1977 CWA amendments received from the
farming community. Thus, although CWA § 404(f) exempted
certain point-source source discharge activities from regulation
under §§ 404, 301(a), and 402, Civiletti could have easily read the
statute to ensure EPA’s broad authority over the permitting of
direct discharges of harmful substances generally, while
Benjamin R. Civiletti, Administrative Authority to Construe § 404 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197 (1979).
55 Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 10, at 709 n.85.
56 Civiletti, supra note 54, at 201.
57 Id. at 201–02.
54
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preserving the Corps’s more specific, narrowly focused § 404
dredge and fill permitting authority. Such an interpretation
would not necessarily have assured different agency regulatory
outcomes as he hypothesized.58
Civiletti’s interpretation of CWA legislative history
arguably encouraged the EPA to revise its CWA § 404(b)
guidelines at the close of the Carter administration. The
guidelines intended to “[r]eflect the 1977 amendments of Section
404 of the […] CWA,”59 with the EPA expanding the general
“presumption against wetland alterations for nonwater
dependent uses or where site or construction alternatives were
available, […] to include ‘special aquatic sites’ such as important
fish and wildlife habitats, marine sanctuaries, and refuges.”
(emphasis added).60 The Guidelines were inconsistent with the
language in § 404(c), as many commenters pointed out.61
However, the EPA felt it was imperative dredge or fill
material not be discharged into aquatic ecosystems, excluding
discharges not having adverse impacts on the area.62 The EPA
was also concerned with filling and dredging affecting the
longevity of wetlands.63 Additionally, the EPA explained the
Guidelines’ presumption relating to the water dependency
provision presumed there were alternatives to “‘non-water
dependent’ discharges” concerning special aquatic locations.64
These “’non-water dependent’” discharges are those not needing
to be close to or in the aquatic area to meet their end-use. 65
Civiletti, supra note 54, at 202.
Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45
Fed. Reg. 85336 (Dec. 24, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230).
60 Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 10, at 709.
61 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45
Fed. Reg. 85336, 85339 (Dec. 24, 1980).
58
59

Id.
Id.
64 Id.
Id.; see also 40 CFR 230.10(a) (1980) (“§ 230.10 […] (a) Except as provided under §
62
63

65

404(b)(2), no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted if there is a
practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on
the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse
environmental consequences. (1) For the purpose of this requirement, practicable
alternatives include, but are not limited to: (i) Activities which do not involve a discharge
of dredged or fill material into the waters of the United States or ocean waters; (ii)
Discharges of dredged or fill material at other locations in waters of the United States or
ocean waters; (2) An alternative is practicable if it is available and capable of being done
after taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall
project purposes. (3) Where the activity associated with a discharge which is proposed for
a special aquatic site (as defined in Subpart E) [, including, § 230.41 Wetlands,] does not
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According to a former DOJ-ENRD attorney actively
involved in CWA § 404 litigation during this period, the Reagan
administration endeavored to soften the impact of these
guidelines66 on the nation’s regulated farming communities,
which the EPA and environmental activists then judicially
challenged. For example, the Office of Management and Budget
Administrator for Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OMBOIRA”) attempted to have the EPA narrow the scope and
prescriptiveness of the CWA § 404(b) guidelines. 67 The Corps
issued 1982 interim final regulations, the purposes of which were
to expedite CWA § 404 permit processing “and expan[d] the
nationwide permit program.”68 By requiring the Corps to balance
multiple factors in the “public interest” when evaluating a CWA §
404 permitting application, these regulations effectively reversed
the burden of proof from the permit applicant to show in advance
a proposed discharge of dredge and fill material meet the
guidelines, to the agency to show the issuance of a permit was
contrary to public interest.69
Litigation over the conflicting EPA Guidelines and Corps
interim final regulations ensued from 1982-1984. One of these
cases, National Audubon Society v. Hartz Mountain Development
Corp., formally recognized the 404(b) guidelines’ water
dependency presumption as rebuttable, rejecting National
Audubon’s argument that 100 percent mitigation of wetlands was

require access or proximity to or siting within the special aquatic site in question to fulfill
its basic purpose (i.e., is not ‘water dependent’), practicable alternatives that do not

involve special aquatic sites are presumed to be available, unless clearly demonstrated
otherwise. In addition, where a discharge is proposed for a special aquatic site, all
practicable alternatives to the proposed discharge into a special aquatic site are presumed
to have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, unless clearly demonstrated
otherwise.”) (emphasis added).
66 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45
Fed. Reg. 85336 (Dec. 24, 1980) (because the 404(b) Guidelines had been issued after
extensive public notice and comment, the Carter administration had referred to them as a
“rulemaking” with binding regulatory effect: “[t]hese Guidelines […] (3) Produce a final
rulemaking document”); see also Corps RGL 93-02 (Aug. 23, 1993), at Sec. 2 (“The
Guidelines, which are binding regulations, were published by the Environmental
Protection Agency at 40 CFR Part 230 on December 24, 1980.”).
67 Lawrence Liebesman, The Role of EPA’s Guidelines in the Clean Water Act §
404 Permit Program — Judicial Interpretation and Administrative Application , 14 ENVTL.
L. REV. 10272, 10275 (1984).
68 Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47 Fed.
Reg. 31794 (July 22, 1982) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 320–30).
69 Id. at 320.4(a); Cf. 45 Fed. Reg. at 85345 (codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 230.1(c)).
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required.70 However, in National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, an
action filed by an environmental activist group challenging the
Corps 1982 interim regulations, the parties reached a settlement
in February 1984 upholding the EPA’s 404(b) guidelines’
presumptions and required the revision of the 1982 Corps
regulations.71 In Lawrence Liebesman’s opinion, “[t]he NWF
settlement certainly did not alter this ‘balancing’ requirement nor
did it transform the rebuttable presumption against discharge in
wetlands to an irreversible presumption.”72
These efforts by the Reagan administration triggered a
request from U.S. Congressman James Oberstar to investigate
and review the Corps’s administration of the CWA § 404
permitting program.73 The GAO found normal farming and
draining were not regulated activities under Section 404 and
losses to wetlands based on these actions are not well tracked.74
The GAO also found wetland boundaries were not defined broadly
enough and the Corps was not reviewing permits practically or
conceptually.75
In referencing the normal farming activities, agricultural
ditch construction, and maintenance activities, the 1977 CWA
amendments authorized the Corps to treat them as exempt from
CWA § 404 permitting.76 However, the GAO Report noted many
such activities would have required a permit under the CWA §
404(f)(2) recapture provision because they converted wetlands to
other uses.77 EPA’s comments to this report are instructive of how
the agency subsequently proceeded to aggressively employ both
70 Nat. Audubon Soc’y v. Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., No. 83-1534D (D.N.J. Oct.
24, 1983); see Liebesman, supra note 67, at 10277 (discusses several other cases in which
permit applicant could not overcome the 404(b) guidelines’s presumption against wetland
alterations for nonwatery dependent uses); see also Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d
1170 (5th Cir. 1982); Hough v. Marsh , 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982); Shoreline
Associates v. Marsh, 555 F. Supp. 169 (D. Md. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 677 (Table) (4th Cir.
Jan. 10, 1984); Cf. 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson , 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983).
71 Final Regulations for Controlling Certain Activities in Waters of the United
States, 49 Fed. Reg. 39478 (Oct. 5, 1984) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 320, 323, 325, and
330); National Wildlife Fed’n v. Marsh, No. 82-3632 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 1982).
72 Liebesman supra note 67, at 10278.
73 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Public Works and Transportation, House of
Representatives, Wetlands: The Corps of Engineers’ Administration of the Section 404
Program, GAO/RCED-88–110 (July 1988), at 3, 6.
74 Id. at 3.

Id.
Id. at 9.
77 Id.
75
76
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the CWA § 404(f)(2) recapture provision and the CWA § 404(b)
guidelines to prevent wetland conversions by the nation’s small
and medium-sized farming communities.78
By this time, the Reagan administration had secured
Congress’s enactment of the Food Security Act of 1985 (“FSA”)79
to ameliorate the harsh impacts on private property rights that
aggressive § 404 enforcement wrought upon the nation’s small
and medium-sized farmers and ranchers. Through the FSA,
Congress provided a prescribed doorway and protected window
period within which farmers and ranchers could proceed, permitfree, to change their land use from natural and cultivated
wetland pasturing and haying to more productive cropping in
furtherance of the nation’s efforts to promote agriculture,
preserve wetlands, and reduce soil erosion. However, certain
federal and state officials and conservationists did not believe the
FSA sufficiently protected wetlands.
As a result, an extensive political campaign and litigation
ensued to interrupt prospective and already authorized farmer
and rancher conversions of wetlands to croplands. Defendants’
previously filed FRCP 60(b) motion described in detail the
extraordinary lengths to which federal and state agencies, led by
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”), along with
federally funded environmental groups, inter alia, Ducks
Unlimited, Inc. and the National Wildlife Federation, had gone to
achieve such interruptions/disruptions. 80
II. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF
PLAIN TEXTUAL MEANING ESPECIALLY IN CWA WETLANDS
LITIGATION
At least one commentator concluded, “[w]etlands
[j]urisdiction [n]ever [s]hifted to the Clean Water Act in Congress
as [c]laimed in [r]etroactive [a]nalysis of [c]ongressional [i]ntent,”
because “Congress never intended to create a permanent federal
wetlands permit program,” and “[w]ith the exception of the
78

See id. at 102, 104.

Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
See Defendants’ Redrafted Mem. Of Law in Support of Redrafted 60(b)(5)
Motion to Vacate Consent Decree and to Deny Stipulated Penalties at 37-51, Brace, No.
1:90-cv-00229, ECF 279; see also Lawrence A. Kogan, Ducking the Truth About the Great
‘Commenced Conversion’ Conspiracy Against America’s Farmers , 27 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC.
L. REV. 19, 30 (2017-2018).
79
80
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‘Swampbuster’ provision in the Food Security Act, Congress has
never articulated the goal of wetlands protection.”81 Only the
Wetlands Loan Extension Act of 197682 (the legislative history of
which did “not mention the Clean Water Act or any goal or
purpose for the protection of wetlands”) indirectly “address[ed]
wetlands protection” by “provid[ing] funds for wetlands
acquisition,” “increased appropriations, and “extend[ed time for]
acquisitions for the 1961 Act until 1983” when the act expired.83
The Senate Commerce Committee did not deem it “necessary to
duplicate the purpose and goal in the Clean Water Act.”84
Thus, even in the absence of any 1977 CWA § 404
statutory text defining the terms “wetlands” or “converted
wetlands,” and/or expressing Congress’s intent to subject the
discharge of dredged or fill materials into non-tidal wetlands
adjacent to manmade agricultural ditches to § 404 permitting,85
the federal agencies (EPA, Corps, and USFWS) and the federal
courts, including the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, improperly
gleaned from selected extracts of unreliable legislative debates
and committee reports the intent of select members of Congress
to protect such wetlands. Neither the agencies and the appellate
court in the initial Brace action, nor the district court in
subsequent consent decree enforcement action, referenced the
plain text of FSA §§ 1204 and 1222 or the subsequently issued
1987 final FSA implementing regulations specifically discussing
these terms in the context of agricultural activities, which would
have provided a different result for the defendants in the Brace.
According to Justice Antonin Scalia, because such
“snippets” of legislative history were utilized “without regard to
the context in which the remarks were made,” their use arguably
resulted in erroneously overbroad interpretations of the

81 Vickie V. Sutton, Wetlands Protection – A Goal Without a Statute, 7 S.C.
ENVTL. L. J. 179, 186–189 (1998) (discussing the U.S. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the
Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1956, the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, and the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1977); See also Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
82 Wetlands Loan Extension Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-125, S. Rep. No. 94-594
(1976).
83 Sutton, supra note 81, at 186–87.
84 Id. at 187.
85 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977); Final
Rules, 42 Fed. Reg. 37144 (codified at 33 CFR 323.2(a)(3)) (July 19, 1977).
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congressional intent underlying CWA § 404.86 Justice Scalia did
not consider legislative history to be an acceptable tool in
statutory interpretation.87 He reasoned, in part, that because
legislative bodies are collectives, it is highly unlikely all of the
legislators had the same understanding.88 In addition, he
rationalized floor statements and committee reports are
inherently unreliable sources of the full Congress’s intent and
more prone to manipulation and distortion.89 Specifically, Justice
Scalia wrote legislators were unlikely to focus on the specific
issues appearing in litigation; they likely debated with varying
opinions if they did discuss the issues.90 The unreliability of
committee hearings and reports also indicate legislative history
should not be relied upon.91
Instead, Justice Scalia argued interpretation of a statute’s
text “begins and ends with what the text says and fairly
implies.”92 Therefore, interpretation is limited to principles based
on language and historical meaning; legislative history is not
included. In addition, “words must be given the meaning they had
when the text was adopted.” 93 Justice Scalia, furthermore, argued
the use of legislative history diverts the focus from the statutory
text to the intent of the legislature, and thereby, substantively
creates a government of men and not of laws.94 He also
emphasized the meaning of statutory terms should be based on
the meaning shown to be most in accord with context and
ordinary usage and most compatible with the surrounding body of
law.95 Significantly, Justice Scalia argued, “the legislative history
was never enacted and is therefore not the law.” 96 Even Professor

86 Elizabeth Liess, Censoring Legislative History: Scalia on the Use of
Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation , 72 NEB. L. REV. 568, 574 (1993).
87 See generally id.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 376 (2012).

Id.
Id. at 16.
93 Id. at 78.
94 See id. at 375.
91
92

95 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co ., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.
concurring).
96 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State , 103. HARV. L.
REV. 405, 430 (1989) (citing Scalia’s concurring opinions in Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 372–373
(1989); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989).
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Cass Sunstein, an advocate of “living constitutionalism”97 who
views original public meaning as a formal nonmandatory
approach to statutory interpretation,98 acknowledged the
legitimacy of Scalia’s concerns.99
Previously, courts understood legislative history as a way
to manipulate a law’s meaning and as a source from which to
infer answers to hypothetically posed questions that suit a court’s
intent.100 Most succinctly, the court in In re Sinclair, wrote
“statutes are law, not evidence of law.”101 Similarly, in Solid

Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, the U.S. Supreme Court employed the plain meaning

approach to interpreting the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) § 404 to
avoid conflict with the Commerce Clause and traditional notions

97See Andrew Coan, Living Constitutional Theory, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 99, 105
(referring to Cass Sunstein as an advocate of “an affirmative vision of American
constitutionalism that could be invoked to support and expand on the Warren Court’s
constitutional decisions. The work of these theorists, notably including Frank Michelman
and Cass Sunstein, is too rich and varied to be neatly summarized here. But their central
argument is that the American constitutional tradition is not merely, perhaps not even
predominantly, one of liberal individualism.”); see also, David A. Strauss, The Living
Constitution, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL
(Sept.
27,
2010),
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/living-constitution [https://perma.cc/39ZD-P5A7].
98 See Cass Sunstein, Originalism, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1697–98
(2018).
99 See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State , 103 HARV.
L. REV. 405, 430 (1989) (Professor Cass Sunstein previously acknowledged that, “judicial
reliance on legislative intent, whether or not derived on the basis of legislative history,
suffers from three basic difficulties” which led him to conclude that “the notion of
legislative intent is at best an incomplete guide to statutory construction”); Id., at 431–
434; see also id. at 468, 474–475 (discussing “a Cautious Approach to Legislative History
as a rule of priority for interpreting regulatory statutes. “As Justice Scalia has
emphasized, legislative history is sometimes written by one side or another in a dispute
over the content of the law, and the history will sometimes reflect a view that could not
prevail in the processes of congressional deliberation. (“In any case, the history is not law.
Courts should therefore adopt a firm principle of the priority of statutory text to statutory
history – a principle that does not call on courts entirely do disregard history, but that
gives the history limited weight in cases of conflict.”).
100 In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989).
101 Id. at 1343; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417–18 (1899) (“[…]
[A statute] does not disclose one meaning conclusively according to the laws of language.
Thereupon we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the
mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they
were used...But the normal speaker of English is merely a special variety, a literary form,
so to speak, of our old friend the prudent man. He is external to the particular writer, and
a reference to him as the criterion is simply another instance of the externality of the
law...We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute
means.”); (“Or as Judge Friendly put things in a variation on Holmes's theme, a court
must search for "what Congress meant by what it said, rather than for what it meant
simpliciter.")
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of federalism.102 The Court held, “[w]here an administrative
interpretation of statute invokes the outer limits of Congress’
power, we expect a clear indication Congress intended such
result.”103
The Court further held “[t]his concern is heightened where
the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a
traditional state power.”104 “Thus, ‘where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problem unless construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.’”105 In effect, the Court in Solid Waste Industry
restricted the scope of the Corps’s permitting jurisdiction under
CWA § 404 by interpreting the statutory term “navigable waters”
so as not to cover small intrastate ponds and intermittent
streams which do not engender interstate commerce.106
The Supreme Court arguably rejected the Court’s prior
deference to agency interpretations of a statute under Chevron
where the agency’s interpretation of § 404(a) would be
unreasonable or result in infringement of a traditional state
power – protection of the environment – through state and local
control of water and land use (i.e., out of federalism concerns).107
The Court in Solid Waste Industry recognized the CWA’s limited
application to only tidal wetlands adjacent to traditional
navigable waters.108
Furthermore, a Supreme Court plurality in Rapanos v.
United States employed the plain meaning approach to
interpreting statutes to effectively reject Chevron deference to a
longstanding Corps interpretation of CWA§ 404.109 In particular,
the Court’s plurality had dispensed with the Corps’s

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
170–81 (2001).
103 Id. at 172 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
104 Id. at 173 (citing See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)) (“[U]nless
Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed
the federal-state balance.”).
105 Id. at 173 (quoting DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575).
102

106

Id.

Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
108 Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 159.
109 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750 (2006).
107
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interpretation of the term “waters” as including “wetlands,”110
intermittent water bodies, (i.e., arroyos) and man-made
channels.111 Rather, the court decided on a narrower
interpretation limiting “waters” to relatively permanent oceans,
rivers, streams and lakes.112 The Rapanos decision also
recognized the CWA’s limited application to only tidal wetlands
adjacent to traditional navigable waters.113
The Supreme Court recalled its prior holding in Iselin v.
United States, where the Court refused to extend the coverage of
a statute covering one subject matter but expressly failing to

Regulatory
Guidance
Letter,
USACE
(Aug.
27,
1986),
https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll9/id/1331
[https://perma.cc/Q3V2-N87B] (The Corps defines the term “wetland” as including
“swamps,” “bogs” and marshes,” which it describes as “truly aquatic areas.”); Swamp,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/swamp [https://perma.cc/HKZ6-YQQA] (last viewed Nov. 25, 2020)
(However, the plain meaning of the term “swamp” is “a wetland often partially or
intermittently covered with water.”); Marsh, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/marsh [https://perma.cc/B3UX-PPGQ] (last
viewed Nov. 25, 2020) (The plain meaning of the term “marsh” is “a tract of soft wet land
usually characterized by monocotyledons (such as grasses or cattails)”); Bog, MERRIAMWEBSTER
ONLINE
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bog
[https://perma.cc/3SS8-JEQ9] (last viewed Nov. 25, 2020) (The plain meaning of the term
“bog” is “a poorly drained usually acid area rich in accumulated plant material, frequently
surrounding a body of open water, and having a characteristic flora (as of sedges, heats
and sphagnum)”).
111 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 725.
112 Id. at 731–33 (“We need not decide the precise extent to which the qualifiers
‘navigable’ and ‘of the United States’ restrict the coverage of the Act. Whatever the scope
of these qualifiers, the CWA authorizes federal jurisdiction only over ‘waters.’ [citations
omitted] The only natural definition of the term ‘waters,’ our prior and subsequent judicial
constructions of it, clear evidence from other provisions of the statute, and this Court's
canons of construction all confirm that ‘the waters of the United States’ in § 1362(7)
cannot bear the expansive meaning that the Corps would give it. The Corps' expansive
approach might be arguable if the CWA defined ‘navigable waters’ as ‘water of the United
States.’ But ‘the waters of the United States’ is something else. The use of the definite
article (‘the’) and the plural number (‘waters’) shows plainly that § 1362(7) does not refer
to water in general. In this form, ‘the waters’ refers more narrowly to water ‘[a]s found in
streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’ or
‘the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bodies.’
Webster's New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter Webster's Second)
[footnotes omitted]. On this definition, ‘the waters of the United States’ include only
relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water. The definition refers to water
as found in ‘streams,’ ‘oceans,’ ‘rivers,’ ‘lakes,’ and ‘bodies’ of water ‘forming geographical
features.’ Ibid. All of these terms connote continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as
opposed to ordinarily dry channels through which water occasionally or intermittently
flows. Even the least substantial of the definition's terms, namely ‘streams,’ connotes a
continuous flow of water in a permanent channel — especially when used in company with
other terms such as ‘rivers,’ ‘lakes,’ and ‘oceans.’”).
113 Id.
110
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include another subject matter.114 More recently, in Lamie v.
United States Trustee, the Court was more explicit.115 It held
courts should not add an “absent word” to a statute.116 According
to the Lamie Court, reading an “absent word into the statute,” as
the petitioner wanted, would enlarge the meaning of a statute
beyond its enacted scope to effectively rewrite it.117 In Lamie, the
Court was unwilling to do so, citing deference to the Legislature
and recognition of constitutional powers.118 The Court’s ruling in
Lamie arguably addressed Congress’s failure to define the terms
“wetlands” or “converted wetlands” anywhere within the text of
the CWA, especially in § 404, whereas Congress expressly defined
these terms within the text of the Food Security Act of 1985
(“FSA”).
In reading the law as Congress had written it (i.e., as it
appears in the statute), therefore, the District Court in Brace
should carefully consider: “Statutory language ‘cannot be
construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.’”119 With such understanding, the District Court should
heed the Supreme Court’s admonition that an agency action
interpreting a statute affecting the rights of private parties must
be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Pursuant to
this standard, the Court should determine whether the decision
was based on a consideration of all the relevant factors the
statute set forth to guide the agency in the exercise of its
discretion, and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.120 Significantly, the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (“USFWS”) in Weyerhauser did not cite Chevron in its
brief to justify the agency’s interpretation of the Endangered
Species Act provision in question.121
Iselin v. U.S., 270 U.S. 245, 250 (1926) (The Court refused to extend coverage where
Congress subjected specific categories of ticket sales to taxation but failed to cover another
category, either by specific or by general language).
115 Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004).
114

Id.
Id.
118 Id.
116
117

119
120

(2018).

Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2016).
See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv. , 139 S. Ct. 361

121 Lisa Heinzerling, Opinion Analysis: Frogs and Humans Live to Fight Another
Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/opinion-analysis-

frogs-and-humans-live-to-fight-another-day/

[https://perma.cc/9TUE-YNGE];

Lisa
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Apparently, the Government sought to avoid providing the
Supreme Court with the opportunity to overrule Chevron, in light
of the strongly worded concurring opinions of Justices Alito,
Scalia, and Thomas in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, which
suggested it was time for the Court to revisit Chevron
precedents.122 In Perez, for example, Justice Thomas’s
concurrence emphasized how such deference tends to give effect
to the interpretation rather than the regulations themselves, and
consequently, to facilitating an unconstitutional transfer of
judicial power (i.e., a transfer of the judge’s exercise of
interpretive judgment) to an executive agency and “an erosion of
the judicial obligation to serve as a ‘check’ on the political
branches.”123
Heinzerling, Argument Preview: Justices to Consider Critical-habitat Designation for
Endangered
Frog,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Sept.
24,
2018),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/09/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-criticalhabitat-designation-for-endangered-frog/ [https://perma.cc/4RWR-4RSP].
122 Perez v. Mort. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgement) (referring to how the Paralyzed
Veterans of America doctrine “may have been prompted by an understandable concern
about the aggrandizement of the power of administrative agencies as a result of the
combined effect of (1) the effective delegation to agencies by Congress of huge swaths of
lawmaking authority, (2) the exploitation by agencies of the uncertain boundary between
legislative and interpretive rules, and (3) this Court’s cases holding that courts must
ordinarily defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.” (citations
omitted); see id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgement) (“The [APA] was framed
against a background of rapid expansion of the administrative process as a check upon
administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not
contemplated in legislation creating their offices.’[citations omitted]. The Act guards
against excesses in rulemaking by requiring notice and comment. Before an agency makes
a rule, it normally must notify the public of the proposal, invite them to comment on its
shortcomings, consider and respond to their arguments, and explain its final decision in a
statement of the rule’s basis and purpose. [citations omitted] […] The APA exempts
interpretive rules from these requirements. §553(b)(A). But this concession to agencies
was meant to be more modest in its effects than it is today. For despite exempting
interpretive rules from notice and comment, the Act provides that ‘the reviewing court
shall…interpret constitutional and statutory provisions and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action.’ [citations omitted]. The Act thus
contemplates that courts, not agencies, will authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes
and regulations.”); see id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I write
separately because these cases call into question the legitimacy of our precedents
requiring deference to administrative interpretations of regulations. That line of
precedents, beginning with Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410 (1945),
requires judges to defer to agency interpretations of regulations, thus, as happened in
these cases, giving legal effect to the interpretations rather than the regulations
themselves. Because this doctrine effects a transfer of the judicial power to an executive
agency, it raises constitutional concerns. This line of precedents undermines our
obligation to provide a judicial check on the other branches, and it subjects regulated
parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”).
123 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1210 (Thomas, J. concurring).
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Interpreting agency regulations calls for that
exercise of independent judgment. Substantive
regulations have the force and effect of law.
Agencies and private parties alike can use these
regulations in proceedings against regulated
parties. Just as it is critical for judges to exercise
independent judgment in applying statutes, it is
critical for judges to exercise independent judgment
in determining that a regulation properly covers
the conduct of regulated parties. Defining the legal
meaning of the regulation is one aspect of that
determination.124

The Thomas concurrence emphasized how, over time, such
deference resulted in “allow[ing] agencies to change the meaning
of regulations at their discretion and without any advance notice
to the parties.”125 The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit sought to address this problem by “requiring agencies to
undertake notice and comment procedures before substantially
revising definitive interpretations of regulations.”126
One legal commentator argued Chevron was not decided
based either on statute or precedent, but rather on “‘institutional
considerations’ typical of the ‘legal process’ school of
interpretation then dominant in the legal academy, which
emphasized agency expertise . . . [and] democratic
accountability.”127 According to the same commentator,
[B]oth of those grounds now seem shaky. The idea
that most decisions by regulatory agencies are
based on non-political expert judgment now
appears naïve. The most important regulatory
choices are political or ideological in the most
fundamental sense, as prioritizing one or another
124 Id. at 1219 (internal citations omitted); See also id. at n.4 (discussing how
agency use of regulations has approached the unconstitutional exercise of legislative
power).
125 Id. at 1221 (citing Paralyzed Veterans of America, v. D.C Arena L.P., 117
F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir.).
126

Id.

Michael McConnell, Kavanaugh and the ‘Chevron Doctrine,’ HOOVER
INSTITUTE (July 30, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/kavanaugh-and-chevrondoctrine [https://perma.cc/5VY8-NTHF].
127
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aspect of the public good, or one or another theory
of economics or social justice.128
The Supreme Court, in two recent decisions, arguably narrowed
the scope of its prior Chevron decision.129
In PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic,
Inc., the Court held that the extent to which a final agency action
warrants deference from federal courts depends on whether the
final agency action is “the equivalent or a ‘legislative rule’” or “an
‘interpretative’ rule;’” only the former has the force and effect of
law.130 Consequently, an interpretative rule “may not be binding
on a district court, and a district court therefore may not be
required to adhere to it.”131 In addition, the Court held that it
must be determined whether the litigant “has a ‘prior’ and
‘adequate’ opportunity to seek judicial review of the Order”
within the statutory scheme in question.132 Justices Thomas and
Gorsuch further emphasized in their concurring opinion that an
agency’s “interpretati[on of] a statute does not ‘determine the
validity’ of an agency order interpreting or implementing the
statute” because only the court possesses the (Article III)
authority to make such a determination.133
In Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court set forth a roadmap
arguably cabining the scope of deference that the Court’s prior
ruling in Auer v. Robbins had accorded to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.134 The Court, in
Kisor held “[f]irst and foremost,” that an agency’s interpretation
128
129

Id.
See PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S.Ct.

2051, 2053 (2019) (focusing on whether the Hobbs Act required the district court to accept
the FCC’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act); Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (focusing specifically on whether courts should defer to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations and guidance
documents).
130 PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2055 (distinguishing between “legislative rule[s]”
“issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority” which have “the ‘force and effect of
law’” and “‘interpretative rule[s]’ which “simply ‘advis[es] the public of the agency’s
construction of the statutes and rules which [they] administer[]’ and lack[] ‘the force and
effect of law.’”).
131 Id.
132 Id (citing 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2012)).
133 Id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As I have explained elsewhere, ‘the
judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its independent
judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.’”).
134 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see also Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (explaining that Auer
deference often does not apply).
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of its own ambiguous rules does not deserve deference “unless the
[agency]
regulation
is
genuinely
ambiguous.”135
The
determination of whether a regulation is ambiguous requires the
exhaustion of “all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” 136 In
other words, it entails a thorough review of “the text, structure,
history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it
had no agency to fall back on.”137 Even where a district
determines that an agency regulation is genuinely ambiguous,
“the agency’s reading must still be ‘reasonable.’”138
Additionally, the district court “must make an
independent inquiry into whether the character and context of
the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight,”139
which will depend on whether the agency’s regulatory
interpretation represents an “‘authoritative’ or ‘official position’”
rather than an “ad hoc statement not reflecting the agency’s
views.”140 According to the Court, only an “official position” will be
entitled to controlling weight, and thus, judicial deference.141 The
Court, furthermore, held that “the agency’s interpretation must
in some way implicate its substantive [or policy] expertise”
relative to the court’s expertise in a given issue.142 Finally, the
Court held that to warrant Auer deference “an agency’s reading
of a rule must reflect ‘fair and considered judgment,’” rather than
a convenient agency litigation position or a defense of a past
agency practice, and must not “create[] ‘unfair surprise’ to
regulated parties.”143 This means, for all intents and purposes,
that “[a] court must assess whether the interpretation is of the
sort that Congress would want to receive deference.”144
In reading the law as Congress had written it, the District
Court should heed the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior ruling in
135 Id. at 2415. (holding that, under Auer and Boles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), “[i]f uncertainty does not exist, there is no plausible reason for
deference.”).
136 Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 2416.
140 Id.
141 Id. (explaining that an ‘official position’ is one that emanates from the
agency’s highest/head official (e.g., “the Secretary or his chief advisers”), is “’published in
the Federal Register,’” is “approved by the agency head,” and/or is “understood to make
authoritative policy in the relevant context.”).
142 Id. at 2417.
143 Id. at 2417-18.
144 Id. at 2424.
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United States v. Estate of Romani, which held, where two
statutes supposedly covering a given subject matter are in
conflict, “the more recent and specific provisions of” the later
statute govern.145 The question presented in Estate of Romani
was whether the Federal Priority Statute required “that a federal
tax claim be given preference over a judgment creditor’s perfected
lien on real property even though such a preference is not
authorized by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966.146 The Court
sought to “harmonize the impact of the two statutes on the
Government’s power to collect delinquent taxes,” noting how “[o]n
several occasions this Court ha[d] concluded that a specific policy
embodied in a later federal statute should control interpretation
of the older federal priority statute” despite explicit amendment
by later act.”147 In holding the Tax Lien Act of 1966 should be
treated as the governing statute, the U.S. Supreme Court
reasoned it was
[T]he more specific statute, […] its provisions are
comprehensive, reflecting an obvious attempt to
accommodate the strong policy objections to the
enforcement of secret liens[,…and i]t represents
Congress’ detailed judgment as to when the
Government’s claims for unpaid taxes should yield
to many different sorts of interests (including, for
instance, judgment liens, mechanics liens, and
attorney’s liens) in many different types of property
(including, for example, real property, securities,
and motor vehicles).148
Given these characteristics of the more recent statute, the Court
determined “it would be anomalous to conclude that Congress
intended the priority statute to impose greater burdens on the
citizen than those specifically crafted for tax collection
purposes.”149
Clearly, the Food Security Act of 1985 (“FSA”) is the more
recent of the two federal statutes. Unlike the CWA, the FSA
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998).
Id. at 519; 31 U. S. C. § 3713(a) (1982).
147 Romani, 523 U.S. at 530.
148 Id. at 532.
145
146

149

Id.
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includes specific provisions to address how wetlands and
converted wetlands present on farmlands are to be treated as a
matter of wetland conservation within “Title XII –
Conservation.”150 Congress dedicated two Subtitles under Title
XII in the FSA to this effort: one defines the terms “wetland” and
“converted wetland,” while the other focuses specifically on
identifying preferable treatment for conversions of non-tidal
pastured and hayed wetlands to croplands.151 As the Supreme
Court concluded in Romani, in seeking to harmonize the impact
of the CWA and FSA in Brace and similar cases, , federal courts
should find it anomalous to conclude that Congress intended the
general “dredge” and “fill” provisions of CWA § 404 to impose
greater burdens on citizen farmers like Mr. Brace, than those
specifically crafted in the FSA for wetland conservation
purposes.152

150

Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L No. 99–198 (HR 2100), 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
151
152

Id.
Romani, 523 U.S. at 532.
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD UNDERSTAND HOW FEDERAL
AGENCIES & COURTS PRIMARILY INFERRED CWA § 404 COVERAGE
OF NON-TIDAL WETLANDS ADJACENT TO MANMADE DITCHES AND
‘CONVERTED WETLANDS’ FROM UNRELIABLE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY

A. Applicable 1977 Clean Water Act “(CWA”) Statutory Text Not
Addressing Wetlands or ‘Converted Wetlands’
The applicable 1977 amendments to CWA § 404 were
enacted on December 27, 1977.153 The statutory language of CWA
§ 404 does not define the terms “wetland” or “converted wetland,”
nor does it express congressional intent that discharges of dredge
and fill material into non-tidal wetlands adjacent to manmade
agricultural ditches should be included within the definition of
“waters of the United States,” and consequently, subject to the
jurisdiction of the CWA § 404 permitting regime. The absence of
these definitions from the statutory text should have informed
federal courts’s interpretation of the § 404(f)(1)(A) and (C)
exemptions, respectively, to “normal farming and ranching
activities” and to irrigation ditch construction and drainage ditch
maintenance activities.
Section 404(a) vests the Secretary of the Army, acting
through the Chief of Engineers, with the authority to issue
permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites.” 154 Pursuant to §
404(b), the Secretary of the Army possesses the authority to
develop guidelines, in conjunction with the Administrator of the
EPA, prohibiting the specification of a site. 155 Under § 404(c) the
Administrator of the EPA can “prohibit the specification
(including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as
a disposal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of
any defined area for specification as a disposal site.156
CWA § 404(f)(1)(A) exempts from § 404 general permitting
the discharge of dredge or fill material from established farming
and ranching activities, including plowing, seeding, cultivating,

Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 99 Stat. 1600 (1977).
CWA § 404(a).
155 CWA § 404(b).
156 CWA § 404(c).
153
154

30

KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 12 No. 3]

and harvesting.157 CWA § 404(f)(1)(C) exempts from general § 404
permitting discharges of dredge or fill material due to the
construction and maintenance of drainage ditches.158 The
recapture provision (CWA § 404(f)(2)) applies despite the
availability of either such exemption. It states that even
incidental discharge of dredge or fill material will need a § 404
permit, if it changes the use of a wetland area by reducing the
reach or impairing the flow or circulation of waters of the United
States.159
CWA § 404(g)(1) affords each state governor the
opportunity “to administer its own individual and general permit
program” for discharges “of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters (other than those waters” currently used or
susceptible to use for interstate commerce, and tidal waters,
“including wetlands adjacent thereto) within its jurisdiction.” 160

B. Agencies Regulations, Guidelines and Policy Statements
Claiming ‘Broad’ CWA § 404 Jurisdiction to Cover Wetlands
Adjacent to Manmade Agricultural Ditches and ‘Converted
Wetlands’
Numerous and frequently changing EPA and Corps
regulations, guidelines and policy statements have been
promulgated to implement the broad CWA § 404 jurisdiction that
federal courts had inferred from legislative history.161

1. 1973 EPA Policy Statement
The first EPA policy statement on protecting wetlands was
issued via federal register, but it did not address “converted
wetlands.”162 However, since the EPA, before issuing this policy
statement, had failed to follow public notice and comment
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, the statement
could not be considered a binding legislative rule upon EPA or
the public.163
§1344(f)(1)(A).
§1344 (f)(1)(C).
159 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.S. §1344(f)(2)
160 CWA § 404(g)(1).
161 CWA § 404(a).
162 See Environmental Protection Agency; Protection of Nation’s Wetlands Policy
Statement, 38 Fed. Reg. 10834-35 (May 2, 1973).
163 See Recommendation 92-2, Administrative Conference of the United States
(Jun.
18,
1992),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/92-2.pdf
157
158
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2. 1975 Corps Interim Final Regulations
Interim Corps regulations issued in 1975 defined
“navigable waters of the United States” to cover “[f]reshwater
wetlands including marshes, shallows, swamps, and similar
areas that are contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters
and that support freshwater vegetation.”164 They did not
expressly cover nontidal freshwater wetlands adjacent to
tributaries of U.S. navigable waters.165

3. The 1977 Corps Final Regulations
The final 1977 Corps regulations explicitly excluded from
the coverage of “waters of the United States” (“WOTUS”) nontidal
wetlands adjacent to tributaries to U.S. navigable waters, where
said “tributaries” actually were “nontidal drainage and irrigation
ditches excavated on dry land.” (emphasis added).166 In this
context, “dry land” meant land other than “wetlands,” which had
been redefined as “[t]hose areas that are inundated or saturated
by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient
to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions.”167 The preamble to these regulations clarified the
agency had not intended “to assert jurisdiction over those areas
[https://perma.cc/4TNH-9A32] (“Where the policy statement is treated by the agency as
binding, it operates effectively as a legislative rule but without the notice-and-comment
protection of section 553. It may be difficult or impossible for affected persons to challenge
the policy statement within the agency’s own decisional process; they may be foreclosed
from an opportunity to contend the policy statement is unlawful or unwise, or that an
alternative policy should be adopted. […] The Conference believes this outcome should be
avoided, first by requiring that when an agency contemplates an announcement of
substantive policy (other than through an adjudicative decision), it should decide whether
to issue the policy as a legislative rule, in a form that binds affected persons, or as a
nonbinding policy statement. Second, to prevent policy statements from being treated as
binding as a practical matter, the recommendation suggests agencies establish informal
and flexible procedures that allow an opportunity to challenge policy statements. […]
Recommendations […] II. Policy Statements A. Notice of nonbinding nature. Policy
statements of general applicability should make clear they are not binding.”).
164 Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army; Permits for Activities in
Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31324(9)(h) (Jul. 25, 1975) (codified at 33
C.F.R. Pt. 209).
165

Id.

Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army; Regulatory Programs of the
Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37144 (July 19, 1977) (codified at 33 CFR pt. 323).
167 Id. at 31728 (emphasis added).
166

32

KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 12 No. 3]

that once were wetlands and part of an aquatic system, but
which, in the past, have been transformed into dry land for
various purposes.”168 This provision appeared to serve more as a
“grandfather” provision addressing already converted wetlands
rather than as a provision concerned with the contemporary
treatment of wetlands in the process of conversion.

4. 1979 and 1980 EPA Detailed 404(b)(1) Guidance
The first detailed EPA rules interpreting § 404
amendments in the context of discharges of dredged or fill
materials were issued in 1979 and 1980, respectively. They were
released initially in the form of a proposed regulation, and then
in the form of “final guidelines,” both of which the EPA argued
had “regulatory effect.”169 The proposed regulations defined the
term “navigable waters” as “…waters of the United States,” while
the final guidelines defined “waters of the United States” as
including: (1) “[a]ll waters which are currently used, or were used
in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign
commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide;” (3) “…intrastate […] rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, and wetlands; the
use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or
foreign commerce including any such waters;” and “(7) wetlands
adjacent to waters identified [above].”170
The 1979 proposed regulations and the 1980 EPA final
guidelines defined the term “wetlands” as locations “inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water” that support flora and
fauna known to thrive in such conditions.171 This includes but is
not limited swamps, marshes, and bogs.172 These rules defined
the term “adjacent” as “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring.”173
The 1980 EPA Final 404(b)(1) Guidelines did not address the
treatment of “converted wetlands,” except to exclude it from the

168

Id.

Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged Material, 44 Fed.
Reg. 54222 (Sept. 18, 1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230); Guidelines for Specification of
Disposal Sites for Dredged Material, 45 Fed. Reg. 85336 (Dec. 24, 1980) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 230).
170 44 Fed. Reg. at 54228; 45 Fed. Reg. at 85336.
171 44 Fed. Reg. at 54228; 45 Fed. Reg. at 85336.
172 44 Fed. Reg. at 54228; 45 Fed. Reg. at 85336.
173 44 Fed. Reg. at 54228; 45 Fed. Reg. at 85336.
169
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definition of “waters of the United States,” and thus, from EPA
jurisdiction.174

5. 1982 Corps Interim Final Regulations
The first Corps regulation addressing these terms was
issued in 1982.175 The Corps defined the term “navigable waters
of the United States,” which framed the scope of its authorities to
issue permits under the Clean Water Act, as being potentially
narrower than the term “waters of the United States.” 176 The
1982 interim final Corps regulations set forth a general definition
of “navigable waters of the United States,” that did “not apply to
authorities under the Clean Water Act which definitions are
described under 33 CFR Part 323.”177 The 1982 regulations
defined “navigable waters of the United States” as “those waters
that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are
presently used, or have been used in in the past, or may be
susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign
commerce.”178
The 1982 Corps interim final regulations addressed the
term “converted wetlands” in the context of the “normal farming
activities” exemption.179 These regulations stated for farming
activities to qualify for such exemption, they should make up an
on-going established farming operation,180 which can include
fields lying fallow as part of practiced conventional crop rotation
techniques.181 The 1982 regulations did not consider either
conversion “activities which bring an area into farming,” or lands
remaining idle for so long that they require modifications to the
hydrological regime to resume operations, as part of already
established farming operation.182 These regulations also

44 Fed. Reg. at 54228; 45 Fed. Reg. at 85336.
Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47
Fed. Reg. 31794, 31811 (Jul. 22, 1982) (to be codified at 33 CFR § 323.2(c)-(d)).
176 Id. at 31829 (to be codified at 33 CFR § 329.4).
177 Id. (to be codified at 33 CFR § 329.1).
178 Id. (to be codified at 33 CFR § 329.4).
179 Id. at 31812 (to be codified at 33 CFR § 323.4(a)(1)(i)).
174
175

Id.
Id. (to be codified at 33 CFR § 323.4(a)(1)(ii)).
182 Id.
180
181
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implemented the CWA § 404(f)(2) recapture provision, as
described in Section III.A above.183

6. 1984 Corps Final Regulations
The 1984 Corps final regulations adopted these definitions
with minor, if any, changes. One of these changes denied the
Nationwide Permit (“NWP”) 26 exemption from CWA § 404
individual permitting otherwise available to discharges of dredge
or fill material into one to ten acres of nontidal streams and
rivers, including adjacent wetlands located above the headwaters
of the WOTUS, if the discharges result in a “substantial adverse
modification” to said waters.184 The NWP 26 exemption will be
denied even though the activity did not convert the WOTUS to
dry land (i.e., cause a “loss” of the WOTUS).185 The Corps
apparently imposed this new recapture trigger to narrow the
availability of this nationwide permit under CWA § 404(e)(1).
“Generally, a substantial adverse modification occurs when a
discharge eliminates the principal valuable functions of a water
of the United States (including wetlands) even though the
discharge does not convert the water to dry land.”186

7. 1986 Corps Final Regulations
Only in the final regulations promulgated in 1986 did the
Corps define “waters of the United States” as broadly as did
EPA’s 1980 final 404(b)(1) guidelines. The 1986 final regulations
provide the prior definition of navigable waters did “not apply to
authorities under the Clean Water Act which definitions are
described under 33 CFR Parts 323 and 328.”187 The 1986 Corps
regulations defined “waters of the United States” identically to
183 Id. at 31813 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R § 323.4(c)) (emphasis added)
(describing the recapture provision as being triggered when the discharge of dredged or fill
material into a WOTUS “is part of an activity whose purpose is to convert an area of the
waters of the United States into a use to which it was not previously subject and the flow
for circulation of waters of the United States may be impaired or the reach of such waters
reduced.”).
184 Final Regulations for Controlling Certain Activities in Waters of the United
States, 49 Fed. Reg. 39478, 39480 (Oct. 5, 1984) (to be codified at 33 CFR § 330.5(a)(26)).
185
186

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

187 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41206, 41251 (to be codified at 33 CFR § 329.1 (emphasis added).
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the 1980 EPA regulations.188 The regulations also define the
terms “wetlands” and “adjacent”189 identically to § 404(b)
guidelines.190 The “normal farming activities” exemption and
recapture provisions contained within the 1982 regulations were
later incorporated within the 1986 revisions to said
regulations.191 The 1986 regulations contained one new addition,
which states “conversion of a wetland to a non-wetland is a
change in use of an area of waters of the United States.”
(emphasis added).192

8. 1986 Corps Guidance – RGL 86-09 – ‘Normal
Circumstances’ of ‘Converted Wetlands
Corps Regulatory Guidance Letter (“RGL”) 86-09
discussed the effect a conversion of a wetland to other uses would
have upon federal jurisdiction.193 The letter stated the Corps had
“listed swamps, bogs, and marshes at the end of the definition at
323.2(c) to further clarify [the agency’s] intent to include only
truly aquatic areas” within the definition of “wetlands.”194 Corps
RGL 86-09
emphasized “the
phrase ‘under
normal
circumstances’” in the definition of “wetlands” was intended for
“areas that are not aquatic but experience an abnormal presence
of aquatic vegetation.”195 The abnormal presence of aquatic
vegetation in a non-aquatic area would not be sufficient to
include that area within the Section 404 program.196
188 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45
Fed. Reg. 85336, 85346 (Dec. 24, 1980) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 230.3(s)); Final Rule for
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41250 (Nov. 13, 1986)
(to be codified at 33 CFR § 328.3(a)).
189 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. at
41251 (to be codified at 33 CFR § 328.3(b)-(c)).
190 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45
Fed. Reg. at 85345 (to be codified at 40 CFR § 230.3(t)).
191 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. at
41233, 41234 (to be codified as 33 CFR § 323.4(a)(1)(i), 323.4(c)).
192Compare Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31812, with Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41325.
193 See Clarification of “Normal Circumstances” in the Wetland Definition, Corps
RGL 86-09, para. 3 (Aug. 27, 1986).
194 Id. (emphasis added).
195 Id.
196 See id. at para. 4 (“The use of the phrase ‘normal circumstances’ is meant to
respond to those situations in which an individual would attempt to eliminate the permit
review requirements of Section 404 by destroying the aquatic vegetation, and to those
areas that are not aquatic but experience an abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation.
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The guidance letter distinguished ‘natural circumstances’
(i.e., where previously converted wetlands left unattended for a
sufficient period of time “would revert to wetlands solely through
the devices of nature) from ‘normal circumstances.’” 197 These are
based on the specific locations characteristics, its use and its
history. If the wetland is altered to the point it no longer falls
under WOTUS, then the land is not under Corps jurisdiction,
unless these characteristics are restored.198

9. 1988 EPA Final Regulations
The EPA’s 1988 final regulations set forth the procedures
states and EPA must follow to apply for and review applications
to administer the § 404 program.199 These regulations define the
terms “waters of the United States,” and “wetlands.”200 They also
provide the criteria required to establish eligibility for
exemptions under “normal farming activities”201 or the
construction of irrigation ditches or the maintenance of drainage
ditches.202
To qualify for the “normal farming activities exemption,
the specified activities must be part of an “establish[ed] (i.e.,
ongoing) farming or ranching operation” and comply with later
definitions.”203 Activities bringing an area into farming or
ranching are not part of an established operation.204 An operation
ceases to be established (i.e., it is effectively “abandoned”) “when
the area in which it was conducted has been converted to another
use, or [it] has lain idle so long that modifications to the
hydrological regime are necessary to resume operations.”205 If an
Several instances of aquatic vegetation to eliminate Section 404 jurisdiction have actually
occurred. Because those areas would still support aquatic vegetation ‘under normal
circumstances,’ they remain a part of the overall aquatic system intended to be protected
by the Section 404 program; therefore, jurisdiction still exists.”).
197 Id. at para. 5.
198 Id.
199 Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions;
Section 404 State Program Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 20764, 20776-20787 (June 6, 1988)
(to be codified at 40 CFR §§ 233.1-233.53).
200 Id. at 20774 (to be codified at 40 CFR § 232.2(q), 232.2(r)).
201 Id. at 20775 (to be codified at 40 CFR § 232.3(c)(1)(i)-(ii)).
202 Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions, 53
Fed. Reg. 20764, 20775 (June 6, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.3(c)(3)).

Id.
Id.
205 Id.
203
204
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activity does not occur within waters of the United States or does
not include a discharge, then a § 404 permit is not needed, even if
it is not part of an established agriculture operation.206 These
criteria are identical to those previously set forth in the 1982
Corps interim regulations.207
The regulations define “cultivating” as a physical way to
treat soil so farming and ranching operations may improve their
yield or quality of the products.208 Harvesting is defined as
physical measures employed directly upon farm or ranch crops
within established agricultural lands to bring about their
removal from farm and ranch.209 In addition, the regulations
define “minor drainage” as the
(A) The discharge of dredged or fill material
incidental to connecting upland drainage facilities
to waters of the United States, adequate to effect
the removal of excess soil moisture from upland
croplands. Construction and maintenance of upland
(dryland) facilities such as ditching and tiling,
incidental to the planting, cultivating, protecting or
harvesting crops, involve no discharge of dredged
or fill material into waters of the United States,
and as such, never require a Section 404 permit.
(B) The discharge of dredged or fill material for the
purpose of installing ditching or other water control
facilities incidental to planting, cultivating,
protecting, or harvesting of rice, cranberries, or
other wetland crop species, where these activities
and the discharge occur in waters of the United
States which are in established use for such
agricultural […] wetland crop production.210
These regulations also define “minor drainage” as:
206 Clean Water Act, 53 Fed. Reg. at 20776 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
232.3(c)(1)(i)(A-B)).
207 Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47
Fed. Reg. 31794 (July 22, 1982).
208 Clean Water Act, 53 Fed. Reg. at 20776 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
232.3(d)(1)).
209 Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions, 53
Fed. Reg. 20764, 20775-20776 (June 6, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.3(d)(3)(i)).
210 Clean Water Act, 53 Fed. Reg. at 20776 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
232.3(d)(3)(i)(A-B)).
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(D) The discharge of dredged or fill material
incidental to the emergency removal of sandbars,
gravel bars, or other similar blockages which are
formed during flood flows or other events, where
such blockages close or constrict previously existing
drainageways and, if not properly removed, would
result in damage to or loss of existing crops or
would impair or prevent the plowing, seeding,
harvesting or cultivating of crops on land in
established use for crop production. Such removal
does not include enlarging or extending the
dimensions of, or changing the bottom elevations of
the affected drainageway as it existed prior to the
formation of the blockage. Removal must be
accomplished within one year after such blockages
are discovered in order to be eligible for
exemption.211

Minor drainage is limited to established farming operations and
does not include drainage related to wetland conversion. 212
The abovementioned EPA regulatory exemption provisions
are identical to those previously set forth in the 1982 Corps
interim final regulations.213 Furthermore, these regulations
contain an almost identical recapture provision to that set forth
in the 1982 Corps interim final regulations.
Any discharge of dredged or fill material into
waters of the United States incidental to any of the
activities identified in paragraph (c) of this section
must have a permit if it is part of an activity whose
purpose is to convert an area of the [WOTUS] into
a use to which it was not previously subject, where
the flow or circulation of [WOTUS] may be
impaired or the reach of such waters reduced.
Where the proposed discharge will result in
211 Clean Water Act, 53 Fed. Reg. at 20776 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt
232.3(d)(3)(i)(D)).
212 Clean Water Act, 53 Fed. Reg. at 20776 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt
232.3(d)(3)(i)).
213 Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47
Fed. Reg. 31794, 31812 (July 22, 1982) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.4(a)(2)).
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significant discernible alterations to flow or
circulation, the presumption is that flow or
circulation may be impaired by such alteration.214

10. 1990 Corps Guidance – RGL 90-07 – ‘Normal
Circumstances’ of ‘Prior Converted Cropland’
In September 1990, the Corps issued RGL 90-07.215 The
guidance letter distinguished the normal circumstances of
wetlands subject to pre-December 23, 1985 completed conversions
(identified as “prior converted croplands”) as defined in § 512.15
of the National Food Security Manual (“NFSAM”), from the
normal circumstances of “farmed wetlands” as defined by
NFSAM § 512.35.216 USDA regulations, meanwhile, state
wetlands should support life that is typical of the area under
“normal circumstances.”217
The manual defines “farmed wetlands” as those
manipulated and used for agricultural means before December
23, 1985 but were not fully converted at that time.218 “Prior
converted croplands,” under the NFSAM are wetlands dredged,
drained, filled, or in any other way manipulated before December
23, 1985 to make the production of an agricultural commodity
possible. 219
According to the RGL, the “normal circumstances” of
farmed wetlands, including “areas with 15 or more consecutive
days (or 10 percent of the growing season whichever is less) of
inundation during the growing season,” are such that wetland
soil and hydrological conditions remain despite an absence of
wetland vegetation due to cropping.220 Thus, the § 404 permitting
of farmed wetlands is required.221 By contrast, the “normal
circumstances” of prior converted croplands are such that they
214 Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions, 53
Fed. Reg. 20764, 20775–20776 (June 6, 1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232.3(b));
Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 47 Fed. Reg.
31794, 31812 (July 22, 1982) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.4(c)).
215 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, Reg. 90-07 (Sept. 26, 1990).
216

Id.

Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. 35194, 35207
(Sept. 17, 1987) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.1(b)(28)).
218 NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY ACT MANUAL (SECOND) § 512.35 (1988).
219 NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY ACT MANUAL (SECOND) § 512.15(a) (1988).
220 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 215, at 2.
221 Id. at ¶ 5.b-c.
217
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“have been subject to such extensive and relatively permanent

physical hydrological modifications and alteration of hydro-phytic
vegetation that the resultant cropland constitutes the ‘normal
circumstances’ for purposes of [S]ection 404 jurisdiction.”222 Thus,
they are not subject to CWA § 404 jurisdiction.223

C. Judicial Resort to Legislative History in Absence of Express
CWA § 404 Statutory Text Addressing Non-Tidal Wetlands
Adjacent to Manmade Ditches and Converted Wetlands
Federal courts previously broadly inferred Congress’s
intent to have CWA § 404 cover non-tidal wetlands adjacent to
manmade agricultural ditches and “converted wetlands”
primarily from sources other than the statute itself. However,
each of the following cases was decided prior to Congress’s
enactment of the Food Security Act of 1985,224 and therefore, did
not reflect Congress’ subsequent intent to address converted
wetlands in the context of agriculture under the FSA.
In United States v. Holland, the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida reverted to unreliable legislative
history rather than to the statutory text of the CWA. 225 It
concluded Congress, in “defin[ing] away in the FWPCA” the test
of navigability, intended for CWA jurisdiction to be broader than
“navigable waters.”226
222
223

Id (emphasis added).
Id.

Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 12211 (1985).
United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
226 Id. at 672 (‘The [Committee of Conference] conferees fully intend that the term
‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation
unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be made for
administrative purposes.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-1326 at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS, 1972, at 327 (1972)); id. (“In presenting the Conference version to the
House, Representative Dingell, a member of the Conference Committee, explained the
Committee’s intention on jurisdiction: ‘The Conference bill defined the term ‘navigable
waters’ broadly for water quality purposes. (502(7)). It means ‘all the waters of the United
States’ in a geographic sense. It does not mean ‘navigable waters of the United States’ in
the technical sense as we sometimes see in some laws.” (quoting LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS, 1972, at 250 (1972)); id. (“After a
brief discussion of Court cases in which the judiciary has forced some expansion of the old
navigability test for water quality purposes, Representative Dingell concluded: ‘Thus, this
new definition clearly encompasses all water bodies, including main streams and their
tributaries, for water quality purposes. No longer are the old, narrow definitions of
navigability, as determined by the Corps of Engineers, going to govern matters covered by
this bill.’”); 373 F. Supp. at 673 (“Clearly, Congress has the power to eliminate the
224
225
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In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
interpreted CWA § 502(7), which defines “navigable waters” as
“waters of the United States, including territorial seas,” as
evidencing Congress’s intent for the CWA to be applied as
broadly as constitutionally permissible, consistent with the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.227 The D.C. District
Court then ordered the Corps to publish proposed regulations
clearly recognizing the full regulatory mandate of the Water Act
within forty days of the Court’s order.228
In Leslie Salt v. Froehlke, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals similarly held Congress clearly meant to expand the
definition of navigable waters based on the legislative history.229
The Court cited the Florida District Court’s holding in Holland,
which based its definition of “navigable waters” on a broad
Constitutional interpretation of the Commerce Clause.230
In Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh , the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held “navigable waters” should be
interpreted broadly by Congress.231 The Court wrote a broad
definition was needed to better control pollution being discharged

"navigability" limitation from the reach of federal control under the Commerce Clause. . . .
Now when courts are forced with a challenge to congressional power under the Commerce
Clause a statute’s validity is upheld by determining first if the general activity sought to
be regulated is reasonably related to, or has an effect on, interstate commerce and, second,
whether the specific activities in the case before the court are those intended to be reached
by Congress through the statute.”).
227 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975)
(“Congress by defining the term ‘navigable waters’ in Section 502(7) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (the
‘Water Act’) to mean ‘the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,’
asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent permissible
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, as used in the Water Act,
the term is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability.”).
228

Id.

Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 754–55 (“It is clear from the legislative history of the FWPCA that for
the purposes of that Act, Congress intended to expand the narrow definition of the term
‘navigable waters,’ as used in the Rivers and Harbors Act. This court has indicated that
the term ‘navigable waters’ within the meaning of the FWPCA is to be given the broadest
possible constitutional interpretation under the Commerce Clause.”) (citing Cal. v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 511 F.2d 963, 964 (9th Cir. 1975), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Envtl.
Prot. Agency v. State Res. Control Bd. 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (“Congress clearly meant to
extend the Act's jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. . .”).
231 Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 915 (5th Cir.
1983).
229
230
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from a point source.232 In reference to the legislative history, the
Appellate Court held conversions of wetlands into croplands did
not constitute “normal farming activities” under § 404(f)(1),
because that provision’s “exemptions [from permitting] do not
apply to discharges that convert extensive areas of water into dry
land or impede circulation or reduce the reach or size of the water
body.”233 Thus, the Court never reached the § 404(f)(2) recapture
issue, which required there first be a “normal farming activity.” It
also ignored the Carter administration Council on Environmental
Quality finding normal farming activities could include
converting wetlands to arable land and not be subject to
recapture,234 so long as extensive areas of water were not
converted to dry land.235
In United States v. Huebner, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held navigable waters should be broadly interpreted.236
The Appellate Court also held the legislative history of the 1977
CWA amendments persuaded it that the “normal farming
activities” exemption should be interpreted narrowly in light of
the broad purpose of the statute.237 The Court in Huebner also
found that the Akers Court238 even went so far as to state, “[a]s

232 Id. (“The control strategy of the Act extends to navigable waters. The
definition of this term means the navigable waters of the United States, portions thereof,
and includes the territorial seas and the Great Lakes. Through narrow interpretation of
the definition of interstate waters the implementation [of the] 1965 Act was severely
limited. Water moves in hydrological cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants
be controlled at the source. Therefore, reference to the control requirements must be made
to the navigable waters, portions thereof, and their tributaries.”) (quoting L EGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, at 1495 (1978).
233 Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, 715 F.2d at 915.
234 See The Ninth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality,
supra note 52.
235 123 CONG. REC. S39,188 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
236 United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1240–41 (7th Cir. 1985).
237 Id. (“Our review of the legislative history of the agricultural exemptions
convinces us that because of the significance of inland wetlands, which make up eightyfive percent of the nation's wetlands,[9] Congress intended that Section 1344(f)(1) exempt
from the permit process only ‘narrowly defined activities…that cause little or no adverse
effects either individually or cumulatively [and which do not] convert more extensive
areas of water into dry land or impede circulation or reduce the reach and size of the
water body.’” (emphasis added)) (citing 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER
ACT, at 420 (1978) (statement of Rep. Harsha, member of the conference committee,
during House debates).
238 See Akers, 785 F.2d at 819.

2019-2020]

HARMONIZING ‘CONVERTED WETLAND’

43

the legislation’s primary sponsor, [former Senator Muskie’s]
remarks are entitled to substantial weight.”239
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the Corps’s regulatory definition of
the term “adjacent wetlands,” in the context of “navigable
waters.”240 The Court held deference should be given to the
agency’s reasonable construction of a stature provided it also does
not challenge Congress’s expressed intent.241 According to the
Court, such review was “limited to the question whether the
agency’s construction of the statute is reasonable, in light of the
language, policies, and legislative history of the Act, for the Corps
to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to but not
regularly flooded by rivers, streams and other hydrographic
features more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters.’” 242 The
Court also held agencies may consider legislative history and
policies if the regulatory authority is unclear.243 These
approaches supported the regulatory authority to define waters
as they did.244
In United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut , the
District Court held Congress’s overwhelming goal was to prevent
wetland conversion.245 The Court reached this conclusion having
looked to § 404’s legislative history to define the scope of “normal
farming activities” exemption under § 404(f)(1)(A) and the scope
of the § 404(f)(2) recapture provision.246 The Court extensively
cited the legislative history to which the Circuit Courts in
Akers,247 Huebner,248 and Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League249

239 Id. citing Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S.
548, 564, 96 S.Ct. 2295, 2304, 49 L.Ed.2d 49 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1243 & n. 48 (D.C.Cir.1980).
240 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
241 Id. at 131, citing Chemical Manufacturers Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 470 U. S. 116, 125 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984).
242 Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 131.
243
244

Id.
Id. at 132.

245 United States v. Cumberland Farms of Connecticut, 647 F. Supp. 1166 (D.
Mass. 1986).
246 647 F. Supp., slip op. at 14.
247 Akers, 785 F.2d at 819.
248 Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1240–41.
249 Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc., 715 F.2d at 925.
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referred, and accorded the prior remarks of former Senator
Muskie “substantial weight.”250
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Brace, in citing many of these cases, gleaned unreliable snippets
from the same legislative history and reached the same
conclusion.251 The Appellate Court held, “the two parts of Section
404(f) […when read together…] provide a narrow exemption for
agricultural activities that have little or no adverse effect on the
waters of the United States.”252
As previously mentioned, at least one legal commentator
found the Court’s ruling in Chevron had been based neither on
statute nor precedent, but rather on “‘institutional considerations’
typical of the ‘legal process’ school of interpretation then
dominant in the legal academy, which emphasized agency
expertise . . . [and] democratic accountability.”253 Given the rapid
expansion of the administrative state since these cases had been
decided, it is more than arguable these prior institutional
presumptions are no longer valid.
Each of these decisions, moreover, preceded the U.S.
Supreme Court’s later ruling in United States v. Lopez. In Lopez,
the Court held the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress
authority to prohibit gun possession within 1,000 feet of a school
on federalism grounds, because it did not qualify as a
“commercial” use “substantially affecting” interstate commerce
(i.e., it did not address the commerce of guns).254 Lopez more
broadly held the Commerce Clause limits Congressional power to
“‘commercial’ uses that ‘substantially affect’ interstate
commerce.”255
The Lopez Court found Congress did not express the
federal statute’s purpose as displacing the states’ historical police

250 Cumberland Farms of Connecticut, 647 F. Supp., slip op. at 13–14, citing 3
Leg. Hist. 474 (1977).
251 Brace, 41 F.3d at 124 (3d Cir. 1994), citing Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v.
Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 926 (5th Cir. 1983); 3 A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act
of 1977: A Continuation of the Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act , at
474 (1978).
252 Brace, 41 F.3d at 124.
253 See Michael McConnell, Kavanaugh And The ‘Chevron Doctrine , STAN. U. HOOVER
INST. (July 30, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/kavanaugh-and-chevron-doctrine
[https://perma.cc/4YLY-B5VH].
254 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580–83 (1995).
255 Vickie Sutton, Wetlands Protection – A Goal Without a Statute, 7 S.C. ENV.
LAW REV. 179, 190 (1998).
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power over education.256 The Kennedy concurrence in Lopez
concluded the statute’s interference with state sovereignty and
disruption of “the federal balance the Framers designed and that
this Court is obliged to enforce” was significant.257 At least two
legal commentators concluded Lopez could potentially invalidate
the application of federal agency regulations to wetlands and
converted wetlands on Commerce Clause grounds.258
These commentators reasoned since the CWA regulations
control the environment, rather than the commerce of wetlands,
the CWA regulations intrude upon a traditional concern of the
States and should be invalidated.259 Indeed, Congress intended to
delegate the obligation to maintain water quality under the CWA
to the states.260 Granted, at the time these articles had been
written, the likelihood was small Lopez could successfully defeat
Congress’s CWA § 404 jurisdiction over freshwater nontidal
wetlands, given federal courts’ reluctance to define navigability
under a plain meaning analysis where the term had been defined
by the agency.261 However, the Court’s new perspective since
having reviewed and tightened its Chevron, Auer, and Seminole
Rock precedents on agency deference may today result in a
different outcome.
V. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT FEDERAL
COURTS AND AGENCIES PRIMARILY IGNORED THE TEXT OF THE
FSA WHICH CLEARLY ADDRESSED THE TREATMENT OF NON-TIDAL
WETLANDS ADJACENT TO MANMADE DITCHES AND ‘CONVERTED
WETLANDS’

A. The Food Security Act is the Only Federal Statute that
Addresses Wetland Conservation
The Food Security Act of 1985 “was the first [federal]
statute to define ‘wetland’ using explicit terms and

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
258 See Sutton, supra note 255, at 187–190.
259 Id.
260 See id. at 187–190; See also Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 92-217,
256
257

§1344 §404(g)(1), 91 Stat. 1601 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §1344(g)(1) (2019)).
261 See Sutton supra note 255, at 190.
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requirements.”262 In fact, Congress has never stated wetland
protection as a goal, excluding the “Swampbuster” provision of
the FSA.263 By comparison, the Clean Water amendments of 1977
used the term ‘wetland’ only when discussing the State’s role in §
404 administration.264
[T]he history shows Congress intended to transfer
the wetlands program, . . . as well as the . . .
permitting program, to the states as soon as
possible. Moreover, the use of the term ‘navigable
waters’ as the source for jurisdiction over wetlands
demonstrates the broad reading of the statute,
which
has
also
caused
difficulties
with
implementation and jurisdiction.265
“‘The result of this legislative [amendment] process was to leave
the section 404 program substantially intact and to give the
administering agencies little new guidance for the definition or
delineation of wetlands.’”266
The FSA also was the first federal statute to require those
in the industry to manage and protect wetlands for USDA
benefits.267 The FSA conditioned eligibility for USDA farm
benefits, first, on producers not “converting” a wetland, and
second, on producers securing an exemption for the conversion
activity qualifying it as either commenced or completed prior to
December 23, 1985.268 From its enactment date, the FSA
determined when actual conversion of a wetland occurred.269 An
actual conversion of a wetland, in other words, occurs if an
agricultural commodity was produced on a converted wetland.

262 Daryn McBeth, Wetlands Conservation and Federal Regulation: Analysis of
the Food Security Act "Swampbuster" Provisions as Amended by the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 , HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 201, 225–26 (1997).
263 See Sutton supra note 255, at 179.
264 See McBeth, supra note 262.
265 See Sutton, supra note 255, at 179.
266 See McBeth, supra note 262, at 226.
267 Id. at 231.
268 Id. at 232–233.
269 Id. at 233, n.208; Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §1221(1), 99

Stat. 1354, 1507 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §3821(1)).
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B. Food Security Act (“FSA”) Statutory Text Defines Wetlands
and ‘Converted Wetlands’ and Thereby Covers Nontidal
Wetlands Adjacent to Manmade Agricultural Ditches and
‘Converted Wetlands’
1. Relevant FSA Statutory Text
FSA § 1221(1) provides, “[e]xcept as provided in [FSA §]
section 1222 and notwithstanding any other provision of law,
following the date of enactment of this Act, any person who in
any crop year produces an agricultural commodity on converted
wetland shall be ineligible for” various otherwise available
United States Department of Agriculture program loans,
payments and benefits.270
Arguably, the “notwithstanding any other provision of
law” language of FSA § 1221(1), which together with FSA § 1204
define “converted wetlands,” conveys Congress’s intent, in light of
the FSA’s enactment after the 1977 CWA amendments, that the
“commenced conversions of wetlands” exemption not be affected
by § 404, which did not address such term at all.271
FSA § 1222(a)(1) provides individuals will not become
ineligible for benefits under FSA § 1221 because of agricultural
production on a converted wetland so long as the conversion was
before the Act’s date of enactment.272 FSA § 1201(a)(1)(A) defined
the term “agricultural commodity” as “any agricultural
commodity planted and produced in a State by annual tilling of
the soil, including tilling by one-trip planters.”273
In stark contrast to § 404, FSA § 1201(a)(4)(A) defined the
term “converted wetland,” as “drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or
otherwise manipulated” land allowing for agriculture commodity
270 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No 99-198, § 1221(1), 99 Stat. at 1507-08
(emphasis added).
271 See Schneider v. United States, 27 F.3d 1327, 1331 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the “’notwithstanding any other provision of law’” in question regarding the finality of
the Secretary’s decision was “clear on its face” and “clearly expresse[d] Congress’s intent
to preclude judicial review and presents no ambiguity that would give rise to a
presumption in favor of judicial review.”); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Thomas,
92 F.3d 792, 796, 797 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding “that the phrase ‘notwithstanding any other
law’ is not always construed literally,” and that the “notwithstanding any other law”
clause in question “directs the disregard only of the federal environmental and natural
resources laws, with respect to Option 9 sales.”).
272 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No 99–198, § 1222(a)(1), 99 Stat. 1354,
1508 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 3822(a)).
273

Id.

48

KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 12 No. 3]

production.274 It includes any activity resulting in the impairment
or reduction of flow, circulation, or reach of water for such
purposes.275 In addition, the conversion activity must have been
undertaken to ensure the possibility of agricultural commodity
production which otherwise would not have been possible, and
the manipulated land was a wetland before the action and was
not considered a highly erodible cropland.276 The FSA defines the
term “wetland” apart from the definition of “converted wetland,”
which § 404 does not. 277 The FSA definition of a “wetland” is land
primarily containing hydric soils and so saturated with water the
ground will support hydrophytic flora.278 Given the FSA’s
considered definitions of ‘wetland’ and ‘converted wetland,’ it is
evident that Congress had intended for the FSA, unlike the CWA,
to cover all tidal coastal wetlands and non-tidal freshwater
wetlands.
The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of
1990 (“FACTA”) amended the FSA by empowering the USDA
Secretary, and his/her likely delegatee to perform an onsite
wetland determination at the landowner’s or land operator’s
request, as opposed to a remote wetland determination based on
aerial photographs; otherwise, FACTA required the USDA
Secretary and his/her delegatee, to perform wetland delineations
on wetland delineation maps as a condition of eligibility to receive
farm program loans, payments or benefits.279 FACTA, also, added
a new section allowing land owners and operators to appeal the
USDA Secretary determinations of their wetland status, and, in
case such a determination is reversed on appeal, for eligibility to
receive such loans, payments or benefits.280
274
275

Id.
Id.

Food Security Act of 1985, § 1201(a)(4)(A) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(4)(A)).
277 See Food Security Act of 1985 § 1201(a)(16) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
3801(a)(16)) (amended 1990).
278 Food Security Act of 1985 § 1201(a)(16) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(16))
(amended 1990).
279 Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, sec. 1422,
§1222(a)(1), 104 Stat. 3359, 3573; id. at 3754.
280 Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, sec. 1422, §1222(e),
104 Stat. 3359, 3574 (The Secretary shall exempt from the ineligibility provisions of
section 1221 any action by a person upon lands in any case in which the Secretary
determines that any one of the following does not apply with respect to such lands: (1)
Such lands have a predominance of hydric soils. (2) Such lands are inundated or saturated
by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support a prevalence
of hydrophytic vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. (3) Such
lands, under normal circumstances, support a prevalence of such vegetation.”).
276
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2. Congressional Intent and USDA
(a) ‘Converted Wetland’
The Conference Committee Report accompanying the FSA
indicates that the Conference Committee had adopted the House
definition of “converted wetland” set forth in § 1201(a)(4)(A) and
codified in 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(4)(A):
The House bill defines the term ‘converted wetland’
to mean wetland that has been converted by
certain activity making the production of
agricultural commodities possible that would not
have been possible but for such activity and that,
before such activity was taken, was wetland and
not highly erodible land nor highly erodible
cropland with several exemptions listed. (Sec.
1201(4).) The Senate amendment is comparable
with respect to ‘converted wetland’ except that it
does not apply to highly erodible cropland (Sec.
1601(a)(4)(A), and though the exemptions are
similar they are stated differently. The Conference
substitute adopts the House provision” (italicized
emphasis in original).281

(b) Pre-December 23, 1985 ‘Commenced Conversion’
The legislative history surrounding the “commenced
conversion” exemption provision of the FSA is contained in the
Congressional Record and Conference Report of the U.S. House of
Representatives. The congressional record for December 17, 1985
indicates that the Conference Committee had reconciled the
difference between the House preference that only “completed
conversions” should be eligible for exemption, and the Senate’s
broader preference that “commenced conversions” should be
eligible for exemption, by adopting the Senate’s broader
preference.282

281
282

H.R. REP. NO. 99–447 at 454–55 (1985) (Conf. Rep.).
131 CONG. REC. 36815, 37106 (1985).
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The Conference Report accompanying the FSA
corroborates this interpretation of the FSA commenced
conversion provision. It states as follows:
(7) Exemption for wetland (Sec. 1222)(a) The House
bill exempts converted wetland from the program
ineligibility provision of section 1202 if the land
became converted wetland before the date of
enactment of the bill. (Sec. 1203(a)(6).) The Senate
amendment exempts converted wetland if the
conversion of the wetland was commenced before
the date of enactment of the bill. (Sec. 1622(a)(1).)
The Conference substitute adopts the Senate
amendment. The Conferees intend that conversion
of wetland is considered to be “commenced'’ when a
person has obligated funds or begun actual
modification of the wetland.” (italicized emphasis
in original).283
This legislative history surrounding “commenced
conversions” strongly suggests that USDA’s addition of the term
“completed conversion” in the final September 17, 1987 USDA
regulations tracked the House version of the exemption from
converted wetlands the Conference Committee Report had
previously rejected. The USDA improperly went beyond the
statutory text of FSA § 1222(a) and the Conference Report to
create a new category of converted wetland for political purposes.

C. Food Security Act (“FSA”) Regulations re ‘Converted
Wetlands’
1. 1986 USDA Interim Regulations
The interim FSA regulation’s preamble stated that
“Sections 1211 and 1221 of the Act [FSA] were designed to
remove the incentive that certain benefits provided by the
Department could give producers to cultivate highly erodible land
or to convert wetlands for the purpose of producing an

283

H.R. REP. NO. 99–447 at 460.
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agricultural commodity.”284 The interim regulations define an
“agricultural commodity” as “any crop planted and produced by
annual tilling of the soil or on an annual basis.”285
The interim regulations also rested the exemption from
ineligibility to receive USDA program benefits set forth in
§1222(a) upon a showing of “commenced conversion.”286 “A person
shall not be determined to be ineligible for program benefits in as
the result of the production of a crop of an agricultural commodity
on: (i) Converted wetland if the conversion of such wetland was
commenced before December 23, 1985,”287 and such crop had been
“planted during the period December 23, 1985, through June 27,
1986.”288 According to the interim regulations,
The conversion of a wetland will be considered to
have been commenced before December 23, 1985, if,
before December 23, 1985, earth moving for the
purpose of draining the wetland was actually
started, or the person applying for the benefits has
legally and financially committed substantial funds
by entering into a contract providing for earth
moving, or otherwise, for the purpose of converting
the wetland. (emphasis added).289
The 1986 interim final regulations also defined the term
“converted wetlands” consistent with FSA § 1201(a)(4):

284

Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. 23496 (June

27, 1986).
285 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. 23496, 23499,
23496, 23502 (June 27, 1986) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12).
286 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23496,
23504.
287 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23496,
23504.
288 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23496,
23504.
289 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23496,
23500 ("It has been determined that a person shall be considered to have commenced the
conversion of a wetland by December 23, 1985, if, prior to December 23, 1985, such person:
(1) Began substantial earth moving for the purpose of draining the wetland or (2) legally
and financially committed substantial funds, by entering into a contract for earth moving,
or otherwise, for the purpose of draining the wetland. The Department shall determine
the amount of land which is exempt under this provision based upon the amount of land
which would be drained by the earth moving required in the contract or, if there is no
contract, which would be drained by the earth moving which had begun prior to December
23, 1985.”).
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‘Converted wetland’ means wetland that has been
drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or otherwise
manipulated (including any activity that results in
impairing or reducing the flow, circulation, or reach
of water) for the purpose or to have the effect of

making the production of an agricultural
commodity possible if: (i) Such production would
not have. Been possible but for such action; and (ii)
before such action (A) such land was wetland; and
(B) such land was neither highly erodible land nor
highly erodible cropland. (emphasis added).290

The 1986 interim regulations, furthermore, set forth
criteria for determining whether land is a “converted wetland.”
For example,
For the purpose of determining whether land is a
converted wetland in accordance with § 12.2(a)(6)
of this part, a wetland shall be determined to have
been drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or otherwise
manipulated for the purpose or to have the effect of
making the production of an agricultural
commodity possible, if the producer or any of the
producer's predecessors in interest caused or
permitted: (1) The removal of one or more of the
hydric soils criteria of such wetland; or (2) The
removal or destruction of hydrophytic vegetation on
such wetland and a prevalence of hydrophytic
vegetation is determined to exist on the same
hydric soil map unit in the local area. (emphasis
added).291
290 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. 23496-01,
23502 (June 27, 1986) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.2 (1987)).
291 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23507 (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. 12.32 (1987)) checked. Section 12.32(a) of the interim rule provides
that a wetland shall be determined to have been drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or
otherwise manipulated for the purpose or to have the effect of making the production of an
agricultural commodity possible if (1) one or more of the hydric soils criteria of such
wetland has been removed or (2) the hydrophytic vegetation on such wetland has been
removed or destroyed. The removal of one or more of the hydric soils criteria or the
removal or destruction of hydrophytic vegetation removes one or more of the criteria that
characterizes an area as wetland. The removal of one or more of the hydric soils criteria or
the removal or destruction of hydrophytic vegetation is an objective measure of the effect
an action has on a wetland. It is a good indication as to whether the action has been taken
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The interim regulations defined “[h]ydric soils” as “soils that, in
an undrained condition, are saturated, flooded or ponded long
enough during a growing season to develop an anaerobic
condition that supports the growth and regeneration of
hydrophytic vegetation.”292 The interim regulations defined
“hydrophytic vegetation” as a plant growing (i) in water; or (ii) a
substrate that is at least periodically deficient in oxygen during a
growing season as a result of excessive water content.”293

2. 1987 USDA Final Regulations
The final 1987 USDA “amended the interim rule
published at 51 FR 23496 (June 27, 1986) and applied to crops
planted after the effective date of this rule and to all
determinations made after or pending on the effective date of this
rule.”294 The final regulations nevertheless maintained the
definitions of “hydric soils,” “hydrophytic vegetation,” and the
criteria SCS shall use for determining the presence of each such
wetland identification parameter set forth in the 1986 interim
regulations.295 The final regulations also maintained the
definition of “wetland” set forth in the interim regulations.296 The
final regulations, like the interim regulations appear to follow the
definition contained in the statute. 297 This definition appears to
be consistent with the federal 3-parameter wetland
identification/delineation standard set forth in the Corps 1987
Wetland Delineation Manual: hydric soils, hydrology, and

for the purpose or to have the effect of making the production of an agricultural
commodity possible on such wetland. Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51
Fed. Reg. at 23499. The interim regulations also provided that, “an agricultural
commodity shall be considered to have been ‘produced’ on […] converted wetland if the
agricultural commodity has been planted.” Highly Erodible Land and Wetland
Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23499.
292 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23503 (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.2 (1987)).
293 Id.
294 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. 35194, 35194
(Sept. 17, 1987).
295 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35201 (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.2 (1987)); 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.31(a)-(b)(3)(iv)(B)(1987).
296 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35202 (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.2 (1987)).
297 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §1201, 99 Stat. 1354, 123-24
(1985) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 3801).
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hydrophytic vegetation.298 It does not appear, however, that SCS
was practically required to identify the presence of the wetland
hydrology parameter.299
“SCS shall determine whether an area of a field or other
parcel of land has a preponderance of hydric soils that are
inundated or saturated,” and “which meet criteria set forth in the
publication ‘Hydric Soils of the United States 1985’[…]which is
incorporated by reference.”300 In addition, the SCS shall
determine whether land has a prevalence of hydrophytic
vegetation present:
For purposes of the definition of ‘wetland,’ […] land
shall be determined to have a prevalence of
hydrophytic vegetation if (i) SCS determines
through the use of the formula specified in
paragraph (b)(3) […] that under normal
circumstances, such land supports a prevalence of
hydrophytic vegetation. The term ‘normal
circumstances’ refers to the soil and hydrologic
conditions that are normally present, without
regard to whether the vegetation has been
removed.” (emphasis added).301
Further, “[i]n the event the vegetation on such land has been
altered or removed, SCS will determine if a prevalence of
hydrophytic vegetation typically exists in the local area on the
same hydric soil under the same hydrological conditions.” 302
Significantly, the final regulations amended the definition
of “converted wetlands” found in the interim regulations.303 A
wetland was no longer deemed converted if further manipulations
of the land (i.e., draining, dredging, filling, leveling) were
required to make possible the production of an agricultural
commodity.304
298 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35207 (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.31 (1987)).
299 See generally id.

Id.
Id.
302 Id.
300
301

303 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35201 (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.2 (1987)).
304

Id.
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‘Converted wetland’ means wetland that has been
drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or otherwise
manipulated (including any activity that results in
impairing or reducing the flow, circulation, or reach
of water) that makes possible the production of an

agricultural commodity without further application
of the manipulations described herein if (i) such
production would not have been possible but for
such action; and (ii) before such action, such land
was wetland and was neither highly erodible land
nor highly erodible cropland.305 (emphasis added).

The final regulations also amended the criteria for
identifying when a wetland has been converted. “Converted
wetland shall be identified by determining whether the wetland
was altered so as to meet the definition of converted wetland set
forth in [7 CFR] § 12.2(a)(6):
(1) Where hydric soils have been used for
production of an agricultural commodity and the

drainage or other altering activity is not clearly
discernible, SCS will compare the site with other

sites containing the same hydric soils in a natural
condition to determine if the hydric soils can or
cannot be used to produce an agricultural
commodity under normal conditions. If the soil on
the comparison site could not produce an
agricultural commodity under natural conditions,
the subject wetland will be considered a converted
wetland. (emphasis added).306
(2) Where woody hydrophytic vegetation has been
removed from hydric soils which permits the
production of an agricultural commodity, and
wetlands conditions have not returned as the result
of abandonment under § 12.33(b), the area will be
considered to be converted wetland.307

Id.
Id.
307 Id. at 35208.
305
306
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The final regulations explained how to apply the definition of
“agricultural commodity” provided in the interim regulations. For
example, “grasses not tilled annually […] do not meet the
definition of an agricultural commodity,” while “grass[es…] used
as a high residue crop in a crop rotation, as distinguished from
permanent hayland or grassland, the existing crop rotation and
management techniques may be considered an acceptable
conservation system for the field.” (emphasis added).308
The regulations broadened the exemption from
ineligibility to receive USDA program benefits for production of
an agricultural commodity on converted wetlands if the
conversion “was commenced or completed” before December 23,
1985.309 In other words, the 1987 regulations added the new
concept of “prior converted croplands” (“PCC”):
The conversion of a wetland […] will be considered
to have been completed before December 23, 1985 ,
if, before that date, the draining, dredging,
leveling, filling or other manipulation, (including
any activity that resulted in the impairing or
reducing the flow, circulation, or reach of water)
was applied to the wetland and made the
production of an agricultural commodity possible
without further manipulation described herein,
where such production on the wetland would not
otherwise have been possible. (emphasis added).
[…Pre-12-23-85] converted wetlands may be
improved by additional drainage, provided that no
additional wetland or abandoned converted
wetland is brought into production of an
agricultural commodity.”310 (emphasis added).
The regulations consider the conversion of a wetland to have
commenced prior to December 23, 1985 if, before such date:
(i) Any of the activities described in § 12.2(a)(6)
[i.e., drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or otherwise
308

Id. at 35196.

Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35203 (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.5 (1987)).
309

310

Id.
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manipulated (including any activity that results in
impairing or reducing the flow, circulation, or reach
of water)] were actually started on the wetland; or
(ii) The person applying for benefits has expended
or legally committed substantial funds either by
entering into a contract for the installation of any
of the activities described in § 12.2(a)(6) or by
purchasing construction supplies or materials for
the primary and direct purpose of converting the
wetland. (emphasis added).311
According to USDA, the final 1987 regulations were
intended to provide persons who commenced a conversion with
the opportunity to complete that conversion without unnecessary
hardships:
The purpose of the determination of conversion
commencement […] is to implement the legislative
intent that those persons who had actually started
conversion of wetland or obligated funds for
conversion prior to the effective date of the Act
(December 23, 1985) would be allowed to complete

the conversion so as to avoid unnecessary economic
hardship. (emphasis added).312

The final regulations thus provided directions to those
who sought to qualify for their pre-December 23, 1985
commenced conversion:
(i) All persons who believe they have a wetland or
converted wetland for which conversion began but
was not completed prior to December 23, 1985,
must, before September 19, 1988, request ASCS to
make a determination of commencement in order to
be considered for exemption under § 12.4(d)(1)(i).
(ii) A person must show that the commenced
activity has been actively pursued or the
311
312

Id.
Id.
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conversion will not be exempt under this section. In
this context, ‘actively pursued’ means that efforts

toward the completion of the conversion activity
have continued on a regular basis since initiation of
the conversion, except for delays due to
circumstances beyond the person’s control. […] Any

conversion activity considered to be commenced
under this section shall lose its exempt status if not
completed on or before January 1, 1995. Only those
wetlands for which the construction has begun or to
which the contract or purchased supplies and
materials relate may qualify for a determination of
commencement. (emphasis added).313
A commenced conversion designation qualifies the
converted area or the minimum area the commenced activity
could convert for the exemption from ineligibility:
The final regulations, moreover, ensure that the
“production of an agricultural commodity on
wetlands converted before, or for which the
conversion was commenced before [12-23-85] is
exempt from [7 CFR § 12] for the area which was
converted or the minimum area the commenced
activity could convert.” (emphasis added).
“Maintenance or improvement of these converted
wetlands for the production of agricultural
commodities are not subject to this rule so long as
such actions do not bring additional wetland into
the production of an agricultural commodity.
Additional wetland means any natural wetland or
any converted wetland that has reverted to wetland
as the result of abandonment of crop production.
(emphasis added).314
The 1987 FSA regulations also imposed a new
requirement on persons seeking a pre-December 23, 1985
conversion exemption “to show when a wetland was converted or

313
314

Id. at 35203–04.
Id. at 35208.
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when conversion was commenced.”315 To this end, “[c]rop history
may be used in converted wetland determinations to analyze the
extent of conversion and the purposes for which conversion was
undertaken.”316 In addition to crop history data, persons must
provide as evidence, “receipts,” “drawings,” “plans” or other
materials showing conversion began or completed before
December 23, 1985.317 Further, the final 1987 regulations defined
the term “abandonment” for “converted wetlands,” a term distinct
from both prior commenced conversions and prior converted
wetlands.318 Abandonment occurs where “cropping, management
or maintenance operations related to the production of
agricultural commodities on converted wetlands” ceases
(emphasis added).319 Where cropping, management or
maintenance operations have ceased, the wetland is abandoned
unless it can be proven there was no intent to abandon it.320 If
there is no crop production for five years, then wetland criteria
must be determined.321
VI. FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THEY CAN
EXERCISE THEIR EQUITABLE DISCRETION TO APPLY THE 1993
JOINT EPA-CORPS RETROACTIVE REGULATIONS TO ENSURE THE
PROPER AND CONSISTENT PLAIN TEXTUAL MEANING OF
‘CONVERTED WETLANDS’ FOR CWA AND FSA PURPOSES

A. Joint EPA-Corps 1993 Regulations Distinguish Between
Wetlands and ‘Converted Wetlands’ Retroactively for CWA
and FSA Purposes, & Broadly Reference USDA-SCS NFSAM
Guidance322
315 Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. at 35200 (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.32 (1987)).

Id.
Id. at 35207.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id. 12.33
322 See Lawrence A. Kogan, CWA § 404: How So Few Words Re Wetlands Have
So Greatly Impaled Private Property Rights, supra, n. 2, at Sec. II(A)4(m)(xviii)(II)(F), at
316
317

46, 48 (referring 33. CFR § 328.3(b)(6) and (c)(9) of Department of Defense, Department of
the Army, Corps of Engineers and Environmental Protection Agency, The Navigable
Waters Protection Rule: Definition of ‘Waters of the United States’ – Final Rule
(Jan. 23, 2020) (prepublication
rule), 85 Fed. Reg. 22250, 22255,
22317, 22320, 22326-27, (April 21, 2020) https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/202001/documents/navigable_waters_protection_rule_prepbulication.pdf ).
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In August 1993, following the close of discovery but prior
to the trial in the action at bar, the EPA and the Corps issued
joint regulations endeavoring “to codify existing policy as
reflected in [Corps] RGL 90-07, that prior converted cropland is
not waters of the United States to help achieve consistency
among various federal programs affecting wetlands […B]oth
agencies continue[d] to follow the guidance provided by RGL 90-7,
which interpret[ed] our regulatory definition of wetlands to
exclude PC cropland.”323 Significantly, the regulation’s preamble
acknowledged
how
administrative/regulatory
consistency
between the CWA and FSA could be enhanced if the EPA and the
Corps, like the USDA-SCS, learned to broadly and flexibly utilize
the guidance contained in the National Food Security Act Manual
(“NFSAM”).324
The 1993 joint regulations effectively signaled the intent
of the EPA and the Corps to harmonize the term “converted
wetland” for purposes of ensuring consistency between CWA §
404 and FSA §§ 1204 and 1222.325 These regulations achieved
this objective by promoting increased interagency (EPA-USDACorps) consultation and going beyond the specific USDA-NFSAM
provisions referenced in Corps RGL 90-07, as appropriate, when
addressing “prior converted cropland” and “farmed wetland”
issues.326 These regulations accorded retroactive treatment to all
pre-December 23, 1985 prior converted croplands as other than
“waters of the United States” if they had not been “abandoned.”327
In determining whether a prior converted cropland had been
abandoned, these regulations directed the EPA and the Corps to
use the SCS provisions on ‘abandonment,’ – i.e., the September
17, 1987 regulation and the NFSAM provisions.328
Although the EPA-Corps August 25, 1993 regulation
discusses the SCS abandonment standard in the context of prior
converted cropland, it is clear the SCS abandonment standard
the EPA referenced in the NFSAM was the same standard
contained in the September 17, 1987 USDA regulations, and such
323 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45031–32 (Aug.
25, 1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R).
324 Id. at 45031–34.

Id.
Id.
327 Id. at 45036–37 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R pt.230).
328 Id. at 40534.
325
326
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standard applies to all “converted wetlands” – both to prior
completed conversions and to prior commenced conversions.329
Thus, if a prior commenced conversion was abandoned under
circumstances other than those beyond the landowner’s control
(e.g., due to intentional disruption, thwarting and nullification of
a prior commenced conversion by federal agencies collaborating
with third-party environmental and wildlife groups for ideological
reasons), such that it could no longer be “actively pursued”
pursuant to 7 CFR § 12.5(d)(5)(ii)-(iii), and consequently,
completed by January 1, 1995, the commenced conversion would
have lost its exempt status, and thus, its eligibility to become
prior converted croplands.330
Hence, the USDA-SCS treatment the EPA and the Corps
accorded to prior converted croplands deemed “abandoned” (i.e.,
not actively pursued during a successive 5-year period), is
arguably analogous to the treatment USDA-SCS accorded to
prior commenced conversions deemed “abandoned” (i.e., not
completed to become prior converted croplands) before the
expiration of the four-year-plus January 1, 1995 window period
the 1987 USDA regulations had provided. 331 In each case, the
subject land would lose its exempt status under both the FSA and
the CWA.332
In Brace, Defendants endeavored to complete their prior
commenced conversion before January 1, 1995, so the 30-acre
Murphy tract would be treated as prior converted cropland
excluded from the definition of “waters of the United States,” and
thus from CWA § 404 jurisdiction.333 By September 21, 1988,
USDA had already designated the Murphy tract 30-acre area
(Field 14 on the USDA Form SCS-CPA-026) as a “converted
wetland” (“CW”) also qualifying as a prior commenced conversion
(“CC”) under the FSA.334 Defendants had intended to return to
USDA to secure a determination that the agricultural commodity
crops they had grown and harvested (i.e., produced) on the
Murphy tract 30-acre area – rye in 1986 and oats and hay in 1987
Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation, 52 Fed. Reg. 35194 (Sept. 17, 1987)
(to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 12).
330 See id. at 121; see also ECF No. 279 supra note 80 at 34-35; Highly Erodible
Land and Wetland Conservation Determination at 4, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No.
279-202.
329

See id.
See id.
333 See Brace, 41 F.3d at 119–20 (3d Cir. 1994).
334 See id. at 121.
331
332
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– had qualified that land as prior converted cropland (“PC”)
entitled to exclusion from CWA § 404 jurisdiction.335 However, by
this time, EPA, USFWS, and USDA-SCS officials had already
intervened and begun to entirely disrupt these efforts. For
example, in 1987 and 1988, these agencies had issued multiple
administrative CWA violation notices, cease-and-desist orders
and threats of federal litigation.336
DOJ-ENRD trial counsel, years ago, clearly admitted the
Government had intentionally disrupted Mr. Brace’s completion
of his prior commenced conversion to “protect the wetland.”337
There is also the “subject of prior converted, prior commenced.”338
The court found this was not a prior converted crop land, and
determined, by stipulation, “this was a wetland at the time of the
discharges.”339 According to the Government, the only thing
commenced conversion reveals is “Mr. Brace commenced the
conversion.”340 As Mr. Brace himself says, “the EPA stopped him
before he could complete the tubing, before he could complete the
conversion” (emphasis added).341
USG counsel’s admitted disruption of Defendant’s prior
“commenced conversion” of the Murphy tract 30-acre area,
however, should have estopped EPA at trial from arguing
335

See Tr. of Non-Jury Trial Proceedings at 19-21, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229,

ECF No. 279-40.

See Brace, 41 F.3d at 119–21.
See ECF No. 279-40, supra note 335, at 539.
338 Id.
339 Id.; see ECF No. 279 supra note 80 at 57 (arguing that the Government had
336
337

improperly misrepresented to the District Court the character of the pretrial stipulation it
had executed with Brace on November 26, 1993 regarding the wetland status of the 30acre area. The stipulation was not a stipulation of fact grounded upon a scientifically valid
wetland delineation of that specific area, but rather a stipulation of law grounded upon a
general EPA-Corps regulatory definition of “wetland” which the district court could have
reviewed de novo. Although the district court had found there was “a wetlands on
stipulation,” it proceeded to find “that not more than 25% of the site met the definition.”
(citing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at para. 4, ECF No. 55)); Neither the
District Court nor the Third Circuit, however, ever considered the caselaw regarding the
extent to which federal courts are bound by party stipulations of fact and law, The case
law shows, to the contrary, that federal courts have disregarded stipulations of fact where
they are manifestly untrue. See Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281
(1917). And, it shows federal courts have disavowed and ruled they are not bound by
stipulations of law. See Swift, 243 U.S. at 289; Estate of Sanford v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 308 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1939); Independent Ins. Agents of America v. Clarke, 955
F.2d 731, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Sebold v. Sebold, 444 F.2d 864, 870 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F. 3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2006); Becker v. Poling Transp. Corp., 356
F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 2004).
340 ECF No. 279-40, supra note 335, at 539.
341 Id.
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Defendant Robert Brace had “abandoned” it, given the USDANFSAM’s criteria for determination of abandonment.342 Pursuant
to those criteria, Mr. Brace’s performance of ongoing
management and maintenance activities (including agricultural
ditch maintenance, drainage tile system repair/replacement
work, mowing) had supported his “commenced conversion” of that
area from farmed pasturelands and hay lands to croplands – i.e.,
in preparation for the planting of an agricultural commodity, had
been “actively pursued” and actually produced an agricultural
commodity in 1986 and 1987.343 It would most likely have been
completed, certainly before January 1, 1995, but for, the
disruption caused by the issuance of multiple federal agency
CWA violation notices, compliance orders and cease-and-desist
letters.
USG’s prior trial counsel proceeded during the 1993 trial
to make the several gross factual misrepresentations.344 First,
they stated the Brace’s had not farmed or pastured the land.345
Rather, the Government argued there was no established ongoing
farming despite actions, like leveling and spreading, intended to
create farming opportunities.346 The Government also argued the
Brace’s convergence of a wetland to pastureland was not
considered farming and in fact was merely “hacking around in a
wetland.”347 Apparently, USG counsel had ignored the 1993 EPACorps joint regulations, which directed EPA and the Corps to
broadly follow SCS’ application of the NFSAM Part 512 prior
converted cropland and abandonment rules, which could be
reasonably interpreted as containing a “non-degradation clause”
protecting wetlands as they existed as of the date of the FSA’s
enactment.348
See ECF No. 279, supra note 80 at 61–62.
See id. at 35, n.11
344 See generally ECF No. 279-40, supra note 335.
345 ECF No. 279-40, supra note 335, at 10.
346 Id. at 538.
347 Id. at 538–39.
348 See Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns, 397 F.3d 472, 474-475 (7th Cir. 2005)
342
343

(holding that the 1996 amendment to the 1985 Swampbuster provisions of 16 U.S.C. §
3821-24, which “added an exception for wetlands that had been drained and farmed, had
reverted to wetland status, and then were restored to agricultural use… [i.e., for a]
‘wetland previously identified as a converted wetland (if the original conversion of the
wetland was commenced before December 23, 1985)’ […] [was] a non-degradation clause:
the legislation protect[ed] wetlands as they actually existed on the date of [the FSA’s]
enactment.”); see also Orchard Hill Building Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No.15cv-06344 (N.D. Ill 2017), slip op. at 10 (noting how, due to “differing standards among” the
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Section V.A of the joint EPA/Corps August 25, 1993
regulations emphasizes the overall federal policy goal of ensuring
consistency in the implementation of both the CWA and FSA
with respect to activities undertaken on agricultural lands.349
We believe […] that effective implementation of the
wetlands provisions of the Act [FSA] without

unduly confusing the public and regulated
community is vital to achieving the environmental
protection goals of the Clean Water Act. The CWA
is not administered in a vacuum. Statutes other
than the CWA and agencies other than EPA and
the Corps have become an integral part of the
federal wetlands effort. We believe that this effort

will be most effective if the agencies involved have,
to the extent possible, consistent and compatible
approaches to insuring wetlands protection. We
believe that this rule achieves this policy goal in a
manner consistent with the language and
objectives of the CWA. (emphasis added).350
As these regulations state, furthermore, the EPA and the
Corps “believe that farmers should generally be able to rely on
SCS wetlands determinations for purposes of complying with
both the Swampbuster program and the Section 404 program.”351
Such regulatory consistency (harmony) will be achieved by
“recognizing SCS’s expertise in making [] PC cropland
determinations” and by “continu[ing] to rely generally on
determinations made by SCS.” (emphasis added).352 This goal also
will be achieved by having the EPA and the Corps utilize the
NFSAM in the same manner as USDA-SCS, in conjunction with
other agency guidance documents, presumably, the Corps’s 1987
Wetlands Delineation Manual:
Corps, EPA, and NRCS (formerly the SCS), “farmers often found it difficult to comply with
all three sets of regulations. Thus in 1993, an effort to provide consistency between the
three agencies, the Corps and EPA jointly adopted a rule implementing the NRCS’s
[SCS’s] prior conversion exemption for purposes of the CWA. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(2).”).
349 See Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45031–32
(Aug. 25, 1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R).

Id.
Id. at 45033.
352 Id.
350
351
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We believe that consistency with SCS policy will

best be achieved by our utilizing the NFSAM in the
same manner as SCS, i.e., as a guidance document
used in conjunction with other appropriate
technical guidance and field-testing techniques to
determine whether an area is prior converted
cropland. […] EPA and the Corps will […]
implement this exclusion in a manner following the
guidance contained in the NFSAM and appropriate
field delineation techniques, and will continue to
rely, to the extent appropriate, on determinations
made by the SCS. […] The fact that we have not
incorporated by reference the actual provisions of
the NFSAM into our rules does not undercut our
ability to maintain consistency. Rather, as
explained above, we believe that utilizing the

NFSAM as a guidance manual, as it is used by
SCS,
will
enhance
consistency
in
the
administration of the Food Security and Clean
Water Act programs (emphasis added).353

Section V.B of the 1993 joint agency regulations further
identifies how the FSA’s distinction between farmed wetlands
and prior converted cropland serves as a reasonable basis to
distinguish between wetlands and non-wetlands under the CWA:
In utilizing the SCS definition of PC cropland for
purposes of Section 404 of the CWA, we are

attempting, in an area where there is not a clear
technical answer, to make the difficult distinction
between those agricultural areas that retain
wetland character sufficiently that they should be
regulated under Section 404, and those areas that
[have] been so modified that they should fall
outside the scope of the CWA. […] We believe that
the distinctions under the Food Security Act
between PC cropland and farmed wetlands
provides a reasonable basis for distinguishing
between wetlands and non-wetlands under the
353

Id.
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CWA. In addition to the fact that we believe this
distinction is an appropriate one based on the
ecological goals and objectives of the CWA,

adopting the SCS approach in this area will also
help achieve the very important policy goal of
achieving consistency among federal programs
affecting wetlands. (emphasis added).354
To recall, the jointly issued 1993 EPA-Corps regulations
stated a very important “policy goal of achieving consistency
among federal programs affecting wetlands” which the agencies
believed, in light of the FSA’s enactment, was “vital to achieving
the environmental protection goals of the Clean Water Act.”355
They also emphasized “the CWA is not administered in a
vacuum.”356 Thus, the distinction these regulations had made
between farmed wetlands and prior converted cropland can be
more broadly understood as the distinction between nonconverted wetlands and “converted wetlands” for both CWA and
FSA purposes.357
The 1993 joint EPA-Corps regulations offer the
grandfather provisions of Sections V.H and III.G as an additional
basis to conclude that actively pursued non-disrupted prior
commenced conversions and prior converted croplands should be
treated similarly for CWA and FSA purposes.358 Section V.H is a
subsection of Section V of the regulations entitled, “Revision to
the Definition of ‘Waters of the United States’ to Exclude Prior
Converted Cropland.”359 Section V generally recognizes prior
converted croplands (“PC”) as converted wetlands that no longer
meet the 3-parameter wetlands definition set forth in the 1987
Corps Wetlands Delineation Manual, and thus, as falling outside
the definition of WOTUS for both CWA and FSA purposes, under
33 CFR § 328.3(a)(8) and 40 CFR § 232.2.360
Section V.H, however, precluded exclusion from the
definition of WOTUS, and thus, from § 404 jurisdiction, of all
354

Id. at 45032.

Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45031–32 (Aug.
25, 1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R.).
356 Id. at 45031.
357 Id. at 45032.
358 See id. at 45031–33.
359 Id. at 45031.
360 See id. at 45031–33.
355
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converted wetlands “that were converted to prior converted
cropland [(“PC”)] between 1972 and 1985 as a result of
unauthorized discharges of dredged or fill material” (emphasis
added).361 This prohibition seemed to apply to all previously nonpermitted/unauthorized wetlands conversion activities that relied
upon a post-December 23, 1985 USDA-ASCS determination that
they had been completed by December 23, 1985, and thus,
qualified for PC status.362
Section III.G is a subsection of Section III of the
regulations entitled, “Revisions to Definition of ‘Discharge of
Dredged Material 33 CFR 323.2(d) and 40 CFR 232.2(e).”363 It
appears to have been applied to cover prior converted croplands
not qualifying under the grandfather provision of Subsection V.H.
Section III, in accordance with CWA § 404 permitting, generally
covered all discharges of dredged material into a WOTUS unless
an applicable permitting exemption applied.364 Section III.G,
however, provided grandfather protection to exclude from the
new definition “certain ‘discharges of dredged material’ that, in
some Corps districts, were not considered to be subject to
regulation under the previous definition of that term.” (emphasis
added).365
This latter grandfather provision had been intended to
end the practice by different Corps districts of exercising their
discretion and reaching inconsistent results which the regulated
public had deemed unfair and inequitable.366 It excluded from
CWA § 404 permitting “discharges of dredged material associated
with ditching, channelization, and other excavation activities in
[WOTUS] where such discharges were not previously regulated
and where such activities had commenced or were under contract
prior to the date of publication of this final rule in the Federal
Register.”367 These activities, if performed in a wetlands by a
farmer, can easily be considered activities undertaken incident to
the “conversion” of pastured or hayed wetlands to a crop farming
use. In addition, such activities had to be “completed within one
361 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45034 (Aug. 25,
1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R.).
362 Id. at 45027.
363 Id. at 45009–10.

See id.
Id. at 45027.
366 Id.
364
365

367 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45027, 45037 (Aug. 25,
1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R.).
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year from the date of publication of the final rule” (i.e., by Aug.
25, 1994).368
Section III.G provided an extension of the one-year
grandfather period to “further ensure that implementation of the
revised definition proceed[ed] in a fair and equitable manner.”369
The Corps could issue an extension concerning the grandfather
clause on a case-by-case basis until August 25, 1996, depending
on whether the discharger could demonstrate the activity was (1)
pursued continuously or periodically, (2) submitted to the Corps a
completed 404 individual permit for review by August 25, 1994,
and (3) ensured such excavation activity did not continue beyond
August 25, 1996.370 If all three conditions had been met, the
Corps allowed the discharger to complete the activity while the
district office reviewed his/her permit application.371

B. USDA-NFSAM’s Broad Approach for Exempting Previously
Farmed Wetlands Converted for Crop Production
The SCS had used Part 512 of the NFSAM entitled
“Wetland Conservation” to address various issues related to the
conversion of wetlands for possible crop production.372 NFSAM §
512.20(a), for example, states the SCS was responsible for
determining whether federally assisted project activities in a
wetland constituted a “prior conversion,” which is “a wetland
alteration completed prior to December 23, 1985.” 373 NFSAM §
512.22(b)(3)(vii) states SCS also was responsible for determining
368

Id.

Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45008, 45009–10 (Aug.
25, 1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 33, 40 C.F.R).
370 Id. at 45027.
371 Id. (At least one Corps district office notified the public that it had interpreted
the one-year (to August 25, 1994) grandfather provision of Section III.G of these joint 1993
regulations as having excluded wetland conversion activities, such as ditching,
channelization, and/or other excavation activities, presumably including side-casting and
grubbing and clearing of sedimentation and debris inundated channel overbank and
contiguous and adjacent areas. This means the Corps district office had interpreted the
grandfather provision as covering both CWA § 404-unauthorized prior converted
croplands and unauthorized prior commenced conversions of wetlands that would not
have qualified under the Section V.H grandfather provision. See reproducing U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Walla, Walla District, Informational Public Notice: Excavation
Activities, Placement of Pilings, and Prior Converted Cropland at 3 (Sept. 17, 1993),
Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No. 279-185.
372 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., NATIONAL FOOD
SECURITY ACT MANUAL, SECOND EDITION at 512.20 (1988), Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF
No. 279-66.
369

373

Id.
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how much conversion had occurred. This is based on the amount
of work completed, the materials purchased before December 23,
1985, and what work was completed, or planned for, either
through contracting or materials.374
NFSAM
§
512.22(b)(3)(vi)
indicates
such
SCS
determination, however, is typically dependent on the ASCS
having first determined “Federally assisted project activities
which convert wetlands or provide outlets for persons to convert
wetlands for the production of an agricultural commodity […had]
started before December 23, 1985.”375 In other words, such SCS
determination requires first the ASCS had determined a
commenced conversion had occurred because (1) conversion
activities had already begun, or (2) funds were legally committed
or otherwise expended, either through contracting or the
purchase of materials.376 In addition, NFSAM § 512.22(b)(3)(v)
indicates such SCS determination also is dependent on the ASCS
having first consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
about the “commenced determination” it is evaluating.377
Most interesting, and arguably, most significant, is
NFSAM § 512.31 entitled, “Use of Prior Converted Croplands
(PC),” which groups together both pre-December 23, 1985
completed (prior) conversions AND pre-December 23, 1985
commenced conversions under one category of “converted
wetlands” (“CW”) eligible for one or more of the FSA
exemptions.378 NFSAM § 512.31 excludes any wetland converted
before December 23, 1985 from the provisions of the FSA.379
Individuals may continue to maintain and even improve drainage
systems put in place on areas classified as prior converted
wetlands, with the provison that conversion of new wetlands does
not occur.380 NFSAM § 512.31(a) considers wetlands given a
commenced conversion determination as “prior conversions when
the commenced activities are completed.”381 The area must also
meet the prior converted cropland criteria and be completed
before January 1, 1995.382
Id. at § 512.22 (b)(3)(vii)..
Id. at § 512 (b)(1)(i)-(ii).
376 Id.
377 Id. at 512.22(b)(3)(v).
378 Id. at 512.31.
379 Id. at 512.31.
380 Id.
374

375

381
382

Id. at 512.31(a).
Id.
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NFSAM § 512.31(b) precludes landowners who obtained a
prior commenced conversion (“CC”) determination for a given
area (field) from converting “additional wetland acres beyond that
which ha[d] been determined to be commenced.”383 This
treatment is consistent with NFSAM § 512.31’s prohibition
against landowners bearing a prior completed conversion (“PC”)
determination converting any additional wetlands. 384 NFSAM §
512.36 shows this consistency of treatment between prior
conversions and commenced conversions in a chart entitled,
“Summary of Use, Maintenance and Improvements of Various
Wetlands Conditions,” an excerpt of which is reproduced below:385
Wetland
Condition
Prior Conversion
(PC) Converted
prior to 12/23/85
but
not
abandoned
Commenced
Conversion (CC)

Use

Maintenance

Improvement

Produce
ag Yes
commodities

Yes

Same as Prior Yes
Conversion
When
Completed

Yes

NFSAM § 512.32(a), furthermore, distinguishes the postDecember 23, 1985 use of lands designated pre-December 23,
1985 commenced conversions from the use of post-December 23,
1985 converted wetlands (CW) “not subject to one or more of the
exemptions.”386 Moreover, NFSAM § 512.35(c) distinguishes the
use of pre-December 23, 1985 commenced conversions from
farmed wetlands (“FW”) of the kind discussed in Corps RGL 9007.387 The limitations the 1987 final USDA regulations impose
383
384

Id. at 512.31(b).
See Gunn v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 118 F.3d 1233, 1235 (8th Cir.

1997) (holding wetlands that were converted to production of agricultural commodities
before the cutoff date of December 23, 1985, “can continue to be farmed without the loss of
benefits, but only so long as the previously accomplished drainage or manipulation is not
significantly improved upon, so that wetland characteristics are further degraded in a
significant way.”).
385 NFSAM, supra note 372, at 512.36.
386 Id. at § 512.32(a).
387 See Gunn v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 118 F.3d at 1238 (stressing
USDA’s distinction between wetlands and converted wetlands and identifying fields that a
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upon the post-December 23, 1985 use of non-converted farmed
wetlands are analogous to the limitations placed upon prior
commenced conversions and prior completed conversions in only
one respect: they prevent further drainage of the wetland as it
previously existed on December 23, 1985.388
Finally, NFSAM § 512.16(a)-(c), like the September 17,
1987 final USDA regulations discussed above, set forth the USDA
standard for “abandonment” which the August 25, 1993 joint
EPA/Corps regulations directed such agencies to follow. 389 In
such, the standard for abandonment is “is the cessation of
cropping, management, or maintenance operations on prior
converted croplands or farmed wetland.”390 The regulation goes
on to define cropping, management or maintenance.391 Cropping
involves the rotation of grasses, legumes or other pasture
products relating to development of an agricultural commodity.392
Actions which support cropping, including “tillage, planting,
mowing, harvesting, repair of drainage systems, etc.,” are
considered management or maintenance. 393
To consider a prior converted wetland abandoned, the
wetland must be both (1) unused, unmanaged or unmaintained
for 5 successive years; and (2) not be involved in a USDA

farmer failed to demonstrate as having been “commenced converted” pre-Dec. 23, 1985 as
likely “farmed wetlands.”); Barthel v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 181 F.3d 934, slip
op. at 6 (characterizing the farmer’s land, which had not been designated either as “prior
converted” or “commenced converted,” consistent with NFSAM § 5.14.23(a) as “‘farmed
wetland pasture or hayland” i.e., as “wetlands that were manipulated and used for
pasture or hayland prior to December 23, 1985, [which] still meet wetland criteria”…); See
also 52 Fed. Reg. at 35208 (Sept. 17, 1987).
388 See Barthel, 181 F.3d at 937-938, 939 (holding with respect to non-converted
farmed wetlands, that the then “current [USDA] regulation on ‘use of wetland and
converted wetland’ provides that changes in the watershed due to human activity which
increases the water regime on a person’s land, can result in a person being allowed ‘to
adjust the existing drainage system to accommodate the increased water regime.’ 7 C.F.R.
§ 12.33(a),” provided “’the previously accomplished drainage or manipulation is not
significantly improved upon , so that wetland characteristics are further degraded in a
significant way’”).
389 52 Fed. Reg. at 35195-6, 7 CFR § 12.33(b) (2019).
390 NFSAM, supra note 372, at 512.16(a)-(c).
391 Id. at 512.16(a)-(c).
392 The 1987 USDA regulations similarly provide that, “grasses not tilled annually […] do
not meet the definition of an agricultural commodity,” while “grass[es…] used as a high
residue crop in a crop rotation, as distinguished from permanent hayland or grassland,
the existing crop rotation and management techniques may be considered an acceptable
conservation system for the field.” (emphasis added). See 52 Fed. Reg. at 35196 (Sept. 17,
1987).
393 NFSAM, supra note 372, at 512.16(a)-(c).
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conservation or restoration program.394 Wetlands found to be
abandoned are then classified as wetlands and fall under specific
wetland provisions.395 Much like the Corps’ 1986 final
regulations,396 the NFSAM definition of “abandonment,” in effect,
treats agricultural ditch maintenance and tile drainage system
repair and replacement related to a prior converted cropland, a
prior commenced conversion when completed, or a previously
farmed wetland, as the normal farming activities of an
established farming operation, where grasslands (e.g., hay) and
pasturelands are regularly rotated with crop production.397
CONCLUSION
Given the similarities and distinctions discussed, the U.S.
District Court in United States v. Brace should conclude that
USDA-SCS had previously determined Defendants’ Murphy tract
qualified as an FSA-“converted wetland” (“CW”) because it had
undergone a much more extensive degree of conversion than what
is characteristic of a farmed wetland subject to CWA § 404
permitting pursuant to Corps RGL 86-9 and Corps RGL 90-07.
Given these similarities and distinctions, USDA-ASCS
determined the pre-December 23, 1985 activities and expenses
Mr. Brace had undertaken and incurred on the Murphy farm
tract had constituted a prior commenced conversion rendering it
eligible to receive USDA subsidies and to be treated as a prior
converted cropland when completed.
In 1986 and 1987, Mr. Brace planted and harvested rye,
oats and hay crops within the Murphy farm tract’s 30-acre
area.398 This was the only remaining step necessary to qualify his
prior commenced conversion (“CC”) of that area as a prior
converted cropland (“PC”) under the FSA.399 It was only in
September 1988 that Mr. Brace secured from USDA-ASCS the
commenced conversion designation for Field 14, which
engendered a look-back to the conversion work he continuously
pursued from 1977 through December 23, 1985.400 Given Mr.
394
395

Id.
Id. See also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(9) (2020).

33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(ii) (1986).
NFSAM, supra note 372, at 512.16(a)-(c).
398 See generally ECF No. 279-40, supra note 335.
399 See generally id.
396
397

400

See id.
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Brace’s planting and harvesting of rye, oats and hay crops in
1986 and 1987, USDA-ASCS only had designated the area as a
CC rather than a PC.401
Once Mr. Brace obtained his CC, he would likely have
been able to complete that prior commenced conversion of the
Murphy farm tract by 1989 or 1990, significantly earlier than the
January 1, 1995 statutory deadline. Mr. Brace was certainly on
track to do just that, but for, the United States’s successful
disruption of it, which had been beyond his control to prevent.402
Moreover, the District Court may reasonably conclude Mr. Brace
had not “abandoned” his normal farming activities or his
“commenced conversion” of the Murphy farm tract. Mr. Brace’s
prior “commenced conversion, once completed by 1989 or 1990,
would have been treated as prior converted cropland excluded
from CWA § 404 jurisdiction pursuant to the retroactive
application of the 1993 joint EPA-Corps regulations broadly
applying the NFSAM “converted wetland” (“CW”) provisions.
In overturning the District Court’s ruling in favor of the
Braces, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals metaphorically “drank
the Kool-Aid” comprised of unreliable legislative history snippets
and wetland-related environmental zealotry bereft of supporting
statutory text and common sense. Instead, the Appellate Court
neglected to examine and determine the proper and correct plain
textual meaning of the term “converted wetlands” for purposes of
both Clean Water Act (“CWA”) § 404 and Food Security Act of
1985 (“FSA”) §§ 1204 and 1222. Had a proper plain textual
meaning been applied in the original action at bar, Mr. Brace
would have been enabled to complete his USDA-authorized prior
commenced conversion of the Murphy tract 30-acre area (and of
the adjacent Marsh tract 11-acre area).403 Such a result would
have been consistent with Congress’s expressed intent of using
the FSA as the prescribed doorway through which farmers, like
Mr. Brace, could proceed CWA-permit-free to rotate their
historically mixed agricultural land use from natural and
cultivated wetland pasturing and haying to more productive
cropping in furtherance of the nation’s efforts to both promote
agriculture, preserve wetlands and control soil erosion.

See id.
See id.
403 See ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 41, 49.
401
402
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As the USDA-SCS’s former state biologist for the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania recently testified, “in
Pennsylvania, it was merely a matter – for forested sites, it was
merely a matter of taking the trees out and pull[ing] the stumps
out. That was a conversion.”404 He also testified “that the NFSAM
only had required Pennsylvania landowners operating north of
the 40th parallel (i.e., located north of the southern Pittsburgh
metro area) ‘in areas that [originally] were forested […] to […]
clear it and plant it to an agricultural commodity,’ to secure a
prior converted cropland (“PC”) designation” – i.e., for it to
become a PC.405 “It never had to be effectively drained [to be
converted…] [s]o there’s a lot of PC in Pennsylvania that still has
wetland hydrology and is on hydric soils.”406 Consequently, if an
Erie farmer had cleared stems and stumps from a formerly
wooded area and then planted a crop before December 23, 1985,
“USDA would have designated that area as ‘PC,’ even if it had
not effectively been drained and still effectively met the wetland
hydrology parameter.”407
In addition, the USDA Pennsylvania state biologist
testified that Mr. Brace had received in 1988 the first, if not the
only, USDA-authorized/designated “commenced conversion”
within Pennsylvania.408 He also testified that he hadn’t been
previously involved in any commenced conversion determination
under the FSA outside Pennsylvania, and that he had not been
aware Mr. Brace possessed a soil and water conservation plan he
acquired in the mid-1970’s and then updated.409 Yet, both he and
the USDA-SCS Conservationist proceeded to determine verbally,
without reference to any USDA form documents, maps or images
relating to Brace’s commenced conversion (e.g., USDA-ASCS
Form AD-1026 and attached map, USDA-SCS-CPA-026, etc.),410
that the Murphy farm tract deserved the designation of
“converted wetlands” (“CW”) for FSA purposes.411
Finally, the District Court may reasonably conclude, the
balance of equities tilt in Brace’s favor because of the recently
404

279-56.

Barry Isaacs Dep. at 26:2-4, Jan. 26, 2018, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No.

ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 53.
Id. at 53-54; ECF No. 279-56, supra note 404, at 21:8–23:14.
407 ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 54.
408 ECF No. 279-56, supra note 404, at 18:6-19:16.
409 Id. at 31:8–34:21.
410 Id. at 35:12–38:1; ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 39–40.
411 See ECF No. 279-56, supra note 404, at 30:17-32:12.
405
406
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presented findings contained in Defendants’ filings and expert
reports. The Defendants’ wetlands expert report rebuts the
scientific validity of EPA’s 1989-1990 wetlands delineation report
which failed to meet the standards of the 1987 Corps Wetland
Delineation Manual.412 It also indicates that EPA’s wetland
evaluation ignored how Defendants had historically used the
Murphy tract, along with two adjacent Brace farm tracts, as a
single mixed agricultural farm engaged in cropping, cultivating
hay, and cultivated and natural pasturing since the 1930’s.413
The report also confirms how Brace had thereafter been
prevented from removing recurring beaver dams on and around
the site due to federal agency imposition of time-consuming and
costly permit review processes which enabled the beaver dams to
transform the wetland hydrology of the site in the interim.414
Furthermore, said report corroborated the findings of the U.S.
Court of Claims that the Murphy tract had been mostly dry by
1979,415 until approximately 1993, and that the purpose of the
1996 consent decree was “to restore what one EPA official
described as the ‘hydrologic drive of the[] wetlands’ to where it
was in 1985.”416
Moreover,
the
corrected
report
of
Defendants’
hydraulic/hydrologic
engineering
experts
explains
the
quantitative hydraulic impact on Brace farm channel surface
water levels and channel overbank and adjacent and contiguous
areas, of five beaver dams present within and beyond the Murphy
farm tract CDA, plus the qualitative impact of an additional large
beaver dam located to the northwest of the Murphy farm tract
CDA.417
Therefore, it remains more than possible the District
Court may decide to exercise its equitable powers to ensure
412

Kagel Environmental, LLC Murphy Tract Wetland Rebuttal R. at 22-26,

Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No. 279-199.

413 This finding was consistent with Defendants’s more recent discovery
contained in the documented materials supporting a U.S. National Park Service National
Historic Place Registry filing. Those documented materials provide historical proof that
mixed agriculture had historically been practiced in Waterford Township and Erie County
since, at least, the 1830’s. See ECF 279, supra note 80, at 40.
414 ECF No. 279-199, supra note 412, at 45–48.
415 ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 63; see Brace, 72 Fed. Cl. at 343 (2006).
416 72 Fed. Cl. at 344; see Jeffrey Lapp Dep. at 610:6-19, Brace, No. 1:90-cv00229, ECF No. 279-8.
417 ECF No. 279, supra note 80, at 87–91 (citing Hydrologic and Hydraulic
Evaluation of Elk Creek on the Robert Brace Farm, Brace, No. 1:90-cv-00229, ECF No.
279-42).
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justice is done in this action. Unfortunately, neither EPA nor the
Corps had exercised their equitable discretion in favor of Mr.
Brace before the 1993 bench trial, even though a joint agency
administrative guidance issued barely two months after the
original action had been filed would have directed them to do so.
EPA and Corps enforcement personnel could have decided, as a
matter of equity, not to refer Mr. Brace’s case to DOJ-ENRD for
civil prosecution because Mr. Brace had received misinformation
from USG agency personnel upon which he reasonably relied
regarding whether the discharge required a 404 permit.418
In sum, considering the prior EPA and Corps failure to
examine the “equitable considerations” surrounding the Brace’s
case prior to initiating the 1990 enforcement action, the Brace
District Court may now reasonably conclude justice and equity in
the current CD enforcement action warrants such consideration.
The District Court, therefore, should exercise its equitable powers
to harmonize the plain text meaning of the term “converted
wetlands” for both CWA § 404 and FSA §§ 1204 and 1222
purposes. This would enable Mr. Brace to complete his prior
commenced conversion of the Murphy farm tract’s approximate
30-acre area, which he would have accomplished in 1989 or 1990
by the planting and harvesting of crops (i.e., production of an
agricultural commodity), but for the Government’s improper
disrupting actions.

418 See EPA-Corps Guidance on Judicial Civil and Criminal Enforcement
Priorities (12-12-90), at 3, discussed in Defendants’ Redrafted Opposition/Response to
United States Second Motion to Enforce Consent Decree and for Stipulated Penalties ,

para. 21, at 17–19.

